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Government Nonendorsement 
Nelson Tebbe†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
What are the constitutional limits on government en-
dorsement? Judges and scholars typically assume that when 
the government speaks on its own account, it faces few re-
strictions. Officials may say almost anything they like without 
constitutional difficulty.  
That belief has gained support from two doctrines and 
their accompanying literatures. First, the Supreme Court has 
fostered it in the course of developing its “recently minted” gov-
ernment speech doctrine.1 That rule holds that when the gov-
ernment speaks, the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause 
simply does not apply.2 In particular, officials may engage in 
viewpoint discrimination, favoring specific ideas without fear of 
committing a constitutional violation.3
 
†  Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Frederic M. Bloom, 
Joseph R. Fishkin, Owen M. Fiss, Chad W. Flanders, Richard W. Garnett, 
Brandon L. Garrett, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Kent Greenawalt, Abner S. 
Greene, B. Jessie Hill, Paul Horwitz, John D. Inazu, Brian Angelo Lee, Chris-
topher C. Lund, Gregory P. Magarian, Dan Markel, Helen L. Norton, Christo-
pher Serkin, Lawrence M. Solan, Olivier Sylvain, and participants in work-
shops at Cardozo, Cornell, Florida State, North Carolina, Pepperdine, and 
Vanderbilt law schools. I am grateful to the Dean’s Summer Research Stipend 
Program at Brooklyn Law School for generous support of this project. Copy-
right © 2013 by Nelson Tebbe. 
 In the process of ex-
plaining the government speech doctrine, the Court has given 
[Editor’s Note: For further discussion of Government Nonendorsement, see 
Abner Greene, Government Endorsement: A Reply to Nelson Tebbe’s Govern-
ment Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES (forthcoming December 
2013), http:// www.minnesotalawreview.org/headnotes.] 
 1. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (calling the doctrine “recently minted”); id. at 485 (Souter, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (same). 
 2. Id. at 467 (“If [the government is] engaging in [its] own expressive 
conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no application.”). 
 3. Id. at 468. 
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the impression that the only real constitutional restriction on 
official expression is the Establishment Clause.4 So Congress 
could not pass a law declaring, for instance, “America is a 
Christian nation,” but it could applaud democracy or denigrate 
smoking. Scholars of free speech, for their part, have likewise 
been working under the assumption that only the Establish-
ment Clause meaningfully restricts government expression.5
Second, experts on religious freedom often assume that 
there is no Establishment Clause for secular matters. Familiar 
doctrine holds that government may not endorse a particular 
faith (or religion generally) in its expression.
 
6 This “endorse-
ment test” ensures that members of the political community 
are not devalued because they hold unpopular religious be-
liefs—it protects equal citizenship with respect to religion.7 The 
existing test stops there, but judges and scholars frequently go 
further and say that there is no such restriction on official en-
dorsement of secular ideas.8
So the assumption that the government is free to endorse 
and denigrate secular ideas is widespread, thanks in part to the 
Supreme Court and in part to scholarship on free speech and 
 Religion is special in this respect, 
according to the usual way of thinking about church-state ar-
rangements. While the government cannot embrace a theology, 
it remains perfectly free to approve any secular outlook, subject 
only to ordinary political constraints. 
 
 4. Id. For a detailed discussion of the Court’s language, see infra Part I. 
 5. For examples from deservedly prominent writers, see Joseph Blocher, 
Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 747 (2011) 
(calling the Establishment Clause “the one clear limitation on government 
speech”); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 605 
(1980) (naming the Establishment Clause as “the one provision of the Consti-
tution that clearly prohibits some government speech”); Steven D. Smith, Why 
Is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the Unnoticed 
Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 953 (2010) (calling 
nonestablishment “the only concrete, enforceable (albeit sporadic), constitu-
tional limit on government speech”). 
 6. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593–95 (1989); Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 7. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593–94. 
 8. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 852 (1961) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (noting the “clear distinction in the wording of the First Amendment be-
tween the protections of speech and religion, only the latter providing a pro-
tection against ‘establishment’”); Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (2000) (“The Constitution forbids the establishment of re-
ligion, but it does not forbid the establishment of secular conceptions of the 
good . . . .”); Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 606 (“[T]here can be no room for a non-
religious establishment clause.”). 
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religious freedom. But that belief is mistaken. In this Article, I 
argue that in fact the Constitution properly imposes a broad 
principle of government nonendorsement. That principle cuts 
across multiple provisions—including equal protection, due 
process, and free speech itself—and it brings them together to 
prohibit any endorsement that abridges full and equal citizen-
ship in a free society.9 Strangely, the government nonen-
dorsement principle is missing from both case law and academ-
ic discussion. Today, the need to correct that oversight is 
particularly acute because the Court is expanding the concept 
of government speech with little regard for the constitutional 
limitations on such expression.10
 
 9. Cf. Summum, 555 U.S. at 482 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that 
“even if the Free Speech Clause neither restricts nor protects government 
speech, government speakers are bound by the Constitution's other proscrip-
tions, including those supplied by the Establishment and Equal Protection 
Clauses”). The Constitution also limits government speech explicitly in several 
places, including the Title of Nobility Clause and arguably the Ninth Amend-
ment, which forbids “disparag[ing]” unenumerated rights. U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 
 10. This Article differs from existing work in at least three ways. First, it 
discusses specific substantive limits on government speech based on its con-
tent, unlike scholarship on government speech that raises more general con-
cerns, such as the worry that government speech will drown out private 
speakers. See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 3–4 (1983); 
Blocher, supra note 5, at 695; Greene, supra note 8, at 68. Second, the Article 
addresses limitations on government expression across the full range of consti-
tutional doctrines, identifying common commitments, whereas other works are 
confined to discrete areas. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Se-
cond-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1267 
(2011) (addressing government expression that violates equal protection and 
religious nonestablishment, with a focus on same-sex marriage, and explicitly 
bracketing broader constitutional restrictions on such speech); Robert D. 
Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment Clause, 
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104, 1104 (1979) (proposing a “Political Establishment 
Clause” that is limited to First Amendment restrictions on political speech); 
Helen Norton, Campaign Speech Law with a Twist: When the Government Is 
the Speaker, Not the Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. 209, 215 n.16 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter Norton, Campaign Speech Law] (looking solely at government electioneer-
ing under the Free Speech Clause); Helen Norton, The Equal Protection Impli-
cations of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159, 162 n.4 
(2012) [hereinafter Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech] (discussing an earli-
er draft of this Article and distinguishing her project, which focuses on equal 
protection); Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 605 n.199 (declining to analyze racist 
and sexist government communications). Similarly, expressive theories of law 
focus on two core provisions, equal protection and religious nonestablishment, 
probably because those works seek to establish the basic proposition that ex-
pressive harms can work constitutional harm at all. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. An-
derson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restate-
ment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1531–51 (2000) (addressing only equal 
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I begin in Part I by briefly defending my descriptive claim 
that the rule against government endorsement of religion is 
commonly thought to stand alone. In Part II, I then lay out the 
argument for a general constitutional principle of government 
nonendorsement. Chiefly, I support that contention by arguing 
for five specific limitations on government speech, drawn from 
diverse areas of constitutional law. Throughout, I contend that 
the principle of government nonendorsement is driven by a co-
herent commitment to full and equal citizenship in a free socie-
ty. Not every instance of government nonendorsement involves 
all three aspects of this concern (full citizenship, equal citizen-
ship, and a free society). Yet each example deploys one or more 
of them, and each therefore helps to demonstrate the existence 
and attractiveness of a general principle of government 
nonendorsement.  
I start with a basic example. Imagine that Congress passed 
a statute or resolution declaring “America is a white nation.” 11
Or consider an official campaign urging citizens to “Vote 
Democrat” in the days leading up to a critical election.
 
Even if that action were purely exhortative, it would violate 
equal protection. Freedom of speech principles also would ar-
guably limit that racialized message, which constitutes 
nonwhite Americans as something less than full participants in 
political life. Reasoning under one or both of these provisions, 
many people will share the view that racialized endorsements 
are properly regarded as invalid.  
12
 
protection and religious nonestablishment, among rights provisions); Deborah 
Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1 
(2000) (equal protection); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive 
Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District 
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 511–12 (1993) (equal 
protection and nonestablishment). Third, this Article uncovers an underlying 
principle of government nonendorsement for the first time, and it identifies 
new ramifications for debates in the areas of political morality and First 
Amendment theory. 
 Gov-
ernment electioneering of that sort would violate the Constitu-
tion, even if it consisted of only a simple statement with no 
regulatory consequences or funding implications. It would dis-
tort basic democratic arrangements. The best doctrinal hook for 
this conviction is the Free Speech Clause. That is because gov-
ernment would be influencing debate surrounding elections, 
 11. See infra Part II.A. This hypothetical is stylized, but real instances of 
racialized government speech have cropped up in court decisions. See id. (cit-
ing cases). 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
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thereby violating an aspect of the Free Speech Clause that pro-
tects structural features of a free society. I conclude below that 
freedom of speech limits public endorsements in the context of 
elections, and it does independent work in that context.  
Part II proceeds by supplementing these two basic exam-
ples with three others. I have two goals in offering these addi-
tional illustrations. First, I aim to show that instances of gov-
ernment nonendorsement are not anomalous within equal 
protection and free speech law. Second, I hope to demonstrate 
that constitutional provisions beyond equal protection and free 
speech are in play—due process in particular.  
Equal protection cases are relatively easy to come by. Per-
haps the most interesting examples right now involve laws that 
exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage.13
Although free speech examples are harder to find, political 
gerrymandering presents a critical one.
 One reason to 
think that such bans are unconstitutional is that they send a 
government message that the people who seek these unions 
have a disfavored stature. That meaning is particularly clear in 
states where couples may acquire all the material benefits of 
marriage by forming a civil union or a domestic partnership.  
14
Regarding due process, consider the right to terminate a 
pregnancy.
 I argue that gerry-
mandering can express partisan disfavor in a way that crosses 
a constitutional boundary. Here too, free speech operates inde-
pendent of other provisions. Gerrymandering’s constitutional 
harms are not easily captured by equal protection, the main al-
ternative to free speech, because political parties are not usual-
ly suspect classes, and because statewide gerrymanders often 
result in representation that is roughly proportionate to public 
opinion in the state, resulting in overall parity. I argue that ex-
treme gerrymandering infringes on voters’ full citizenship—on 
their interest in robust political participation—and not mainly 
their concern for equal citizenship.  
15
 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
 Any free nation should place some limits on ex-
treme efforts by the government to dissuade women from hav-
ing abortions. Directing a government employee to stand out-
side an abortion clinic and shout discouraging remarks may 
well be unconstitutional, for instance. Substantial interference 
with the basic right to terminate a pregnancy violates not only 
freedom for its own sake, but also “a woman’s autonomy to de-
 14. See infra Part II.D. 
 15. See infra Part II.E. 
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termine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship 
stature.”16
Part II ends by anticipating likely questions, the most im-
portant of which ask (1) when speech is attributable to the gov-
ernment, (2) whether official action counts as expressive, and (3) 
what limits government nonendorsement. While these issues 
are interesting, none of them undermines the project. In the 
end, the basic argument is just that a general principle of gov-
ernment nonendorsement applies to official expression wherev-
er it concededly occurs. Whether something counts as govern-
ment expression, therefore, is secondary. So is the question of 
limits, but nevertheless I describe how the proposal is in fact 
confined to those few instances of government endorsement 
that implicate full and equal citizenship in a free society.
 
17
Part III shifts gears and draws out implications of govern-
ment nonendorsement for political and constitutional theory. 
Three stand out. First, constitutional limitations on official en-
dorsement tell us something about the nature of American de-
mocracy. Government nonendorsement obviously resists politi-
cal theories that envision limitless government endorsement of 
moral values, yet it could also be understood to resist theories 
that require strict state neutrality as to comprehensive concep-
tions of the good. It thus suggests a path between these two 
paradigmatic conceptions of political theory. Second, the Article 
augments free speech theory. Unlike existing work, it identifies 
discrete places where the government might face restrictions, 
even where it obviously is contributing to public debate. Less 
conventionally but perhaps more powerfully, it begins to articu-
late a new rationale—a full citizenship theory—for limiting 
government action that constitutes speakers as disabled. Third, 
the argument mostly supports contemporary scholars of reli-
gious freedom who argue that religion should not have a special 
position in constitutional law. Yet some differences remain be-
tween religious and nonreligious government speech in this re-
gard. As I show, religious nonendorsement remains more re-
 
 
 16. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing). 
 17. Another framing point concerns audience. I only address people who 
adhere to the mainstream view that government endorsement of religion itself 
can be unconstitutional. Working from that core case, I contend that govern-
ment messages on secular topics may raise analogous constitutional questions. 
For a defense of the basic idea that government expression can be unconstitu-
tional, see Anderson & Pildes, supra note 10. For discussion of one argument 
against even the basic principle of religious nonendorsement, see Part II.A. 
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strictive than secular nonendorsement. Part III ends by asking 
why that might be, and it answers that some of the values driv-
ing the Establishment Clause do not in fact have secular ana-
logues.18
Let me pause here to address methodology, for those at-
tuned to it. My approach is evaluative but situated. It does not 
hew to precedent closely, trying to make the best sense of posi-
tive constitutional doctrine. But neither does the method argue 
for pure normative preferences. Rather than either of these, it 
seeks a worthwhile way forward from an embedded perspective 
that interprets basic constitutional arrangements, with an eye 
to convincing contemporary actors.
 
19 Throughout, it aims for a 
reflective equilibrium, working back and forth between com-
mon intuitions about concrete scenarios and theoretical evalua-
tions of them.20
I.  CURRENT UNDERSTANDING   
 Finally, and critically, it is concerned with con-
stitutional argumentation wherever it may occur, not only or 
even primarily in courts.  
The descriptive claim that the Establishment Clause is 
widely thought to provide the only clear constitutional re-
striction on government speech requires a defense. This Part 
provides that defense, albeit briefly. 
In Summum, the Court declared that the Free Speech 
Clause “does not regulate government speech,” but only “gov-
ernment regulation of private speech.”21 In other words, when it 
comes to official expression, “the Free Speech Clause has no 
application”22 and the government “is entitled to say what it 
wishes.”23
 
 18. That last section develops an argument that I first suggested in Non-
believers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1140–49 (2011). 
 In particular, the government may favor certain 
viewpoints over others when it is communicating on its own 
behalf rather than regulating the expression of private citizens. 
The idea seems to be that communication is necessary for gov-
 19. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 87–90 (1986) (describing an in-
terpretive approach to legal argumentation).  
 20. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46–53 (1972) (explaining the 
concept of reflective equilibrium); Hellman, supra note 10, at 6 (building on 
Rawls’s reflective equilibrium). 
 21. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. The idea had been prefigured in other cases. For example, the 
Court here quotes Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 
515 U.S. 819, 833 (1998). 
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ernance, and that entails selecting among points of view.24 Both 
content and viewpoint discrimination are essential to the gov-
ernment’s daily operation.25
This is true even where officials must burden or disfavor 
private messages in order to clarify the government’s own posi-
tion. So in Summum itself, the Court upheld a town’s refusal to 
erect a permanent monument that a private religious group 
had donated for inclusion in a public park. Justice Alito, writ-
ing for seven others, said that the existing monuments ex-
pressed the town’s conception and celebration of its own history 
and that including the private display would confuse that mes-
sage. It was necessary to disfavor a private message—to engage 
in viewpoint discrimination—in order to preserve government 
speech. Moreover, the state could enlist private actors to articu-
 
 
 24. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is the very business of government 
to favor and disfavor points of view on (in modern times, at least) innumerable 
subjects . . . .”); Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of 
Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380 (2001); Helen Norton, Not for 
Attribution: Government’s Interest in Protecting the Integrity of Its Own Ex-
pression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1321–22 (2004). 
 25. The term “government speech” is misleading, at least as it is used in 
the government speech doctrine. This Article does not concern government 
speech in that sense. Let me briefly critique the concept and frame my project 
in alternative terms.  
When the Court calls something government speech in a case like 
Summum, it is really concluding that the rule against viewpoint discrimina-
tion should not apply. After all, the government is an entity and it necessarily 
communicates through individuals, many of whom are arguably private. So 
the real question in these cases is not whether an expression really is at-
tributable to the government, but rather whether the rule against viewpoint 
discrimination ought to apply. That is a normative matter, not a descriptive 
one. Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 84, 101 (1998). An influential effort to identify the normative 
principles that govern that determination is Robert C. Post, Subsidized 
Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 153 (1996). For instance, Post argues that when 
the government is contributing to public debate, rather than managing its own 
affairs or setting down rules to guide government employees, it has greater 
constitutional leeway to say what it likes. Id. 
By contrast, I am interested here in situations where the government ad-
mittedly can engage in viewpoint discrimination—and therefore is deploying 
government speech in that sense. I ask whether, even in those situations, 
there are constitutional values or provisions that restrict what government 
can say. That too is a normative question, but the evaluative criteria are dif-
ferent from those that are relevant to answering whether an utterance or ex-
pression counts as government speech for purposes of the government speech 
doctrine. Put in conventional terms, this Article articulates constitutional lim-
its that apply even when everyone agrees that the government is contributing 
to public debate on issues of the day, so that viewpoint discrimination is per-
missible.  
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late and broadcast its worldview.26 After all, the park also in-
cluded a Ten Commandments monument that had been donat-
ed by a private group.27
In the course of its discussion of the government speech 
doctrine, the Summum Court created an impression that the 
Establishment Clause stands virtually alone in its restriction of 
official expression. In a noticeable final paragraph, the Court 
said, “This [inapplicability of the Speech Clause] does not mean 
that there are no restraints on government speech. For exam-
ple, government speech must comport with the Establishment 
Clause.”
  
28
Of course, nothing in this passage required the interpreta-
tion that nonestablishment is the only limit on official expres-
sion.
 
29 Nevertheless, the Court’s strong formulation of the gov-
ernment speech doctrine, combined with the fact that it named 
only one constitutional limitation, has furthered the perception 
that religious messages are the only ones that the government 
must avoid when it is communicating its own views. That un-
derstanding has been received, and reinforced, by lower 
courts.30 Observers have contributed to it as well.31
Proposed limits on government speech have usually been 
more general, meaning they have not been specific to the con-
tent of the particular message. For example, some have argued 
 
 
 26. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 (“A government entity may exercise this 
same freedom to express its views when it receives assistance from private 
sources for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled message.”). 
 27. Although the Ten Commandments monument had been adopted by 
the town, the obvious Establishment Clause challenge was not before the 
Court. In any event, it likely would not have succeeded after Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 677 (2005) (upholding a Ten Commandments monument). 
 28. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468.  
 29. In fact, the very next sentence gestured toward another possible 
boundary, the restriction on electioneering that I will explore in Part II.B. 
Without explicitly invoking the Constitution, the Court said that the “in-
volvement of public officials in advocacy may be limited by law, regulation, or 
practice.” Id. 
 30. See, e.g., ACLU of Fla. v. Dixie Cnty. Fla., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1285 
(N.D. Fla. 2011) (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of 
private speech, it does not regulate government speech. This does not mean 
that there are no restraints on government speech. Government speech must 
still comport with the Establishment Clause.”).  
 31. See sources cited supra note 5; see also Daniel W. Park, Government 
Speech and the Public Forum, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113, 145–46 (2009) (arguing 
explicitly that because the Constitution sets one express limit on government 
speech, it implicitly rejects all others). 
  
2013] GOVERNMENT NONENDORSEMENT 657 
 
for transparency.32 That principle prevents subterfuge, in which 
officials invoke the doctrine to effectively regulate private 
speakers. It also prevents ventriloquism, where the govern-
ment transmits its message through private speakers without 
alerting listeners to the real source of the message.33 Others 
have expressed a concern that official broadcasts will drown out 
competitors, monopolizing certain speech markets.34 They 
therefore have called on the government to ensure that there 
are adequate alternatives for private voices, and even to pro-
vide those alternatives if necessary.35 Still others have pointed 
out that public schools and universities cannot tailor their mes-
sages (or their support for private messages) as freely as other 
policymakers.36
Scholars certainly have proposed constitutional limitations 
on official expression in specific doctrinal areas and factual set-
tings,
 These are all valuable contributions, but they 
differ from the one I am making here. 
37
II.  GOVERNMENT NONENDORSEMENT   
 and I will return to their arguments below when I dis-
cuss particular restrictions. But no one has assembled a full set 
of substantive constitutional limits on government endorse-
ment—religious and secular—and no one has shown how these 
limitations are connected by commitments to full and equal cit-
izenship in a free society. Meanwhile, the impression that the 
Establishment Clause stands alone, or virtually alone, has per-
sisted. The remainder of the Article challenges that assump-
tion.  
In this Part, I demonstrate the existence and contours of 
the government nonendorsement principle with the help of five 
illustrations. Throughout, I argue that the principle properly 
guards against government expression that infringes on full 
and equal citizenship in a free society. This theme is drawn not 
only from political theory, but also from an interpretation of ex-
isting law, beginning with the endorsement test for religious 
expression that I have already described. After using relatively 
uncontroversial examples to highlight the commitment to gov-
 
 32. See, e.g., Norton, Campaign Speech Law, supra note 10, at 255–56. 
 33. Greene, supra note 8, at 49–52. 
 34. See, e.g., YUDOF, supra note 10, at 38–50. 
 35. Blocher, supra note 5, at 701. 
 36. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991); David Cole, Beyond Uncon-
stitutional Conditions, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 716 (1992). 
 37. See sources cited supra note 10. 
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ernment nonendorsement and to show that its boundaries track 
commitments to full and equal citizenship, I then extend the 
argument in less obvious directions. 
Two examples in particular are paradigmatic and less con-
troversial than others: racialized expression and government 
electioneering. Sections A and B argue for nonendorsement in 
these areas. The next three Sections defend the argument with 
respect to more controversial situations. Those additional ex-
amples concern not only equal protection and free speech, but 
due process as well. Section F concludes by addressing objec-
tions to the analysis and by setting up the argument for theo-
retical ramifications in Part III. 
A. RACIALIZED SPEECH 
Racialized government expression can be unconstitutional. 
Imagine that Congress issued a joint resolution declaring that 
“America is a white nation.”38 Even if the statement carried no 
legal consequences, but instead simply expressed lawmakers’ 
sense of the national ethos, it would violate the Constitution.39
Why exactly would that communication be unconstitution-
al? There are several ways to answer, and disentangling them 
provides a framework for identifying limits on government 
speech in subsequent examples. 
  
Equal protection obviously grounds the principal objection, 
namely that such expression wrongly discriminates on the ba-
sis of race. Yet there is diversity of opinion on the exact nature 
of the violation. Views cluster roughly around two interpreta-
tions of equal protection: anticlassification and anti-
subordination. I use them as ideal types, which are constructed 
to isolate important arguments for purposes of analysis, and 
not necessarily to describe positions adopted in pure form by 
existing constitutional actors. Ultimately, I argue that a ver-
 
 38. For a similar hypothetical, see Dorf, supra note 10, at 1322. 
 39. That scenario is stylized, but it isolates a dynamic that has operated 
in real cases as well. A relatively straightforward example is Anderson v. Mar-
tin, in which Louisiana required ballots to display the race of each candidate. 
375 U.S. 399, 400 (1964); see also YUDOF, supra note 10, at 261–62. That 
measure was invalid because it sent an official message to voters that race 
should matter in their decision making. See 375 U.S. at 402 (“[B]y directing 
the citizen’s attention to the single consideration of race or color, the State in-
dicates that a candidate’s race or color is an important—perhaps paramount—
consideration in the citizen’s choice . . . .”). Of course, Anderson came down the 
way it did partly because the law harmed the electoral chances of minority 
candidates, but the expressive component provides an independent ground for 
the result.  
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sion of the antisubordination approach better justifies govern-
ment nonendorsement in a way that links up with a broader 
concern for full and equal citizenship in a free society. But I go 
further and show that the anticlassification approach also 
stands in the way of racialized pronouncements, and therefore 
that the two main approaches to equal protection converge 
around the principle of government nonendorsement, at least 
in this doctrinal context. 
1. Antisubordination Theory 
Antisubordination theorists believe that equal protection 
presumptively prohibits government actions that harm equal 
citizenship.40 This is similar (but not identical) to the Estab-
lishment Clause inquiry into whether government endorsement 
of religion carries a social meaning that constitutes outsiders as 
disfavored members of the political community.41
Brown was rightly decided, on this view, not simply be-
cause segregation involved government classification on the ba-
sis of race, but largely because it relegated nonwhite citizens to 
an inferior legal status.
 Specifically, 
both approaches apply not only to government conduct, but also 
to official endorsement. So proclaiming that “America is a white 
nation” is presumptively unconstitutional because it renders 
nonwhites subordinate as citizens.  
42 As Charles Black put the point some-
what more generally, Brown was correct because “the social 
meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in a position 
of walled-off inferiority.”43
 
 40. Dorf, supra note 
  
10, at 1294; Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 154–55 (1976).  
 41. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (articulating the modern endorsement test). One difference is that the 
endorsement test often highlights feelings, whereas the strain of 
antisubordination theory that I am describing asks whether the government 
has constituted minorities as second-class—an inquiry that is legal, not psy-
chological. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 10, at 1524, 1528, 1548; Hellman, 
supra note 10, at 10. 
 42. See William M. Carter, Jr., Affirmative Action as Government Speech, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 2, 25–36 (2011) (arguing that colorblindness alone cannot 
explain Brown, but only the social effect of the state message in the context of 
a particular history). 
 43. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 
YALE L.J. 421, 426–27 (1960); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. 
SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 302–03 n.11 (2007) 
(quoting Black, supra); Dorf, supra note 10, at 1293 (same). 
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For similar reasons, antisubordinationists would condemn 
the holding of Palmer v. Thompson.44 There, the city of Jackson, 
Mississippi closed its public swimming pools after a court or-
dered them desegregated. The Court upheld the action on the 
theory that nonwhites had not been impacted, since they did 
not have access to public swimming pools in the first place, and 
because no discriminatory regulation remained in effect after 
the facilities were closed.45 But for antisubordinationists, the 
city’s decision to close the pools rather than desegregate them 
helped to send an unmistakable message that minorities occu-
pied a subordinate status within the political community.46
Of course, social meaning is often disputed, and so adher-
ents of the antisubordination theory will face difficult determi-
nations.
  
47 Think for instance of the confederate flag, which elic-
its divergent interpretations when it is flown by state 
governments.48 There is no easy way around this problem, 
which is also faced by the standard prohibition on government 
endorsement of religion. I will have more to say about ambigui-
ties in social meaning below.49
2. Anticlassification Theory 
 Regardless of this difficulty, 
antisubordination theorists doubtless will oppose racialized en-
dorsements by the government. And they will do so precisely 
because of the harm to equal citizenship—a crucial component 
of the government nonendorsement principle. More surprising 
is that anticlassificationists likewise should prohibit such en-
dorsements on their own theory. 
Those whose view of equal protection focuses on whether 
the state has classified on an impermissible basis disapprove of 
departures from colorblindness. Because racialized endorse-
 
 44. 403 U.S. 217, 224–26 (1971). 
 45. Id. For similar reasons, antisubordinationists would argue that in-
competent racism, which tries but fails to negatively affect minorities, could 
violate equal protection. Only concerns of judicial management would disturb 
this result, but again I put them aside. 
 46. Carter, supra note 42, at 23 (calling the meaning of Jackson’s action 
“unmistakable”). If anticlassificationists found the government’s purpose to 
qualify as a classification, they too would object to the holding in Palmer. 
 47. See Dorf, supra note 10. For more on Dorf’s proposal, see infra Part 
II.C. 
 48. See NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990) (upholding dis-
play of the confederate flag above Alabama’s capitol dome); James Forman, 
Jr., Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag from Southern State 
Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505, 514–15 (1991). 
 49. See infra Part II.D. 
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ments necessarily classify on prohibited grounds, 
anticlassificationists ought to join antisubordinationists in op-
posing them. For example, they should object to the pro-
nouncement that “America is a white nation” simply because it 
deploys a prohibited distinction.  
Of course, the reasons for enforcing race blindness vary 
somewhat within this camp. One sentiment is that government 
classifications encourage citizens to view one another according 
to their race and not as individuals.50 Another is that govern-
ment classifications foment social divisiveness.51
Some members of this school may object that only actions 
by the government are constitutionally worrisome—that pure 
speech, or government expression unaccompanied by material 
injury, can never amount to a violation of equal protection. 
They might point to cases on standing that seem to support this 
position, insofar as these cases indicate that racialized govern-
ment messages do not work constitutional harm without 
more.
 Whatever the 
precise rationale, this theory resists official organization of citi-
zens according to their race. 
52 Or they might invoke decisions that seem to require 
both discriminatory purpose and disparate impact to make out 
an equal protection claim.53 Building on such decisions, some 
scholarship has suggested that current law does not condemn 
government endorsement of racial bias,54 and that the Court’s 
willingness to adjudicate claims of religious endorsement is 
anomalous in constitutional law.55
 
 50. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (“[A]t the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of 
equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat cit-
izens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or 
national class.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Carter uses that case to 
argue that the Court now objects to the expressive impact of racial classifica-
tions, independent of any tangible effects. Carter, supra note 
  
42, at 12–13. 
 51. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 10, at 1537 (discussing divisive-
ness); Reva Seigel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging 
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1307 (2011).  
 52. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755–56 (1984) (citing cases).  
 53. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971). 
 54. See, e.g., Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech, supra note 10, at 163–
64 (arguing that current equal protection doctrine does not outlaw “racist or 
other hateful speech” by the government, critiquing that law, and suggesting 
reforms).  
 55. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 165 (1992) (arguing that just as courts refuse to adju-
dicate claims of government stigmatization on the basis of race, so too they 
should refrain from striking down religious endorsements). 
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A first response is that standing doctrine speaks to prob-
lems of judicial enforcement and administration that I have set 
to one side in this Article. My concern is whether constitutional 
arguments can be made against unlimited government en-
dorsement and disparagement—on the substance and wherever 
they may occur. Below, I therefore highlight examples of consti-
tutional restrictions on official speech imposed by the political 
branches, rather than by the courts.56 Importantly, constitu-
tional debate regarding religious endorsement is moving to the 
political branches as well, now that the Court is strengthening 
standing restrictions on Establishment Clause claims.57
A deeper response is that whatever the state of current 
law, the position that government speech never raises constitu-
tional concerns is difficult to support even under the 
anticlassification theory of equal protection. At least according 
to the dominant version of that theory, the main worry is pre-
cisely that government classification on the basis of race sends 
the odious message to society that membership in a racial 
group matters more than individuality. That concern holds re-
gardless of whether the message is accompanied by action that 
disproportionately affects persons in a more tangible way.
 But 
outright religious endorsements are still widely thought to be 
constitutionally problematic, even where they now cannot be 
litigated. 
58
Evidence comes first from cases concerning state classifica-
tions that are designed to promote, rather than deny, racial 
equality. Those decisions are paradigmatic; they separate theo-
rists who are focused on subordination from those focused on 
classifications. And in them, judges enamored of colorblindness 
 A 
few examples support the conclusion that anticlassification 
theorists should and in fact do often object to racialized gov-
ernment expression, without more. 
 
 56. Allen v. Wright could raise a relevant concern, even though standing is 
not my focus, if it was understood to say that expressive harm alone raises no 
constitutional problem on the merits. However, that decision is probably bet-
ter read to address standing alone. The Court acknowledges that “[t]here can 
be no doubt that this sort of noneconomic injury is one of the most serious con-
sequences of discriminatory government action,” and it goes on to describe the 
harmful consequences of allowing standing in a way that arguably has more to 
do with court administration than with substantive constitutionality. 468 U.S. 
at 755–56. 
 57. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007). 
 58. See Carter, supra note 42, at 13–14 (arguing that adherents of color-
blindness on the Court are objecting to an expressive harm); Dorf, supra note 
10, at 1294 (“[W]hat is classification if not a form of expression?”).  
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have resisted racial distinctions without regard to their effects, 
which can be negligible or nonexistent. Decisions concerning 
majority-minority districting fall into this category. In Shaw v. 
Reno, for instance, the Court discounted evidence that redis-
tricting designed to bolster minority representation in the legis-
lature did not harm nonminorities through vote dilution.59 In 
fact, nonminorites retained control of a disproportionately large 
number of voting districts, even after the plan at issue took ef-
fect.60 Instead of focusing on tangible harm, Justices sympa-
thetic to anticlassification theory highlighted the social mes-
sage that the bizarrely-shaped districts conveyed, namely that 
race was the sole or predominant factor in political decision 
making.61 Therefore, the Court in Shaw quite clearly rectified a 
constitutional harm associated with expression alone when it 
deemed the redistricting unconstitutional.62 Another, more re-
cent, example is Parents Involved, where the reasoning of the 
plurality—a group dominated by anticlassificationists—focused 
on the expressive harm of school policies that deployed racial 
categories in order to diversify public schools, even though 
those policies did also affect nonminorities in concrete ways.63
 
 59. 509 U.S. 630, 649–50 (1993). 
  
 60. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 10, at 494. 
 61. See id.; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 10, at 1538–39; Dorf, supra 
note 10, at 1294–96; Hellman, supra note 10, at 17–18, 26–27. Note that it was 
the expressive signification of the district that mattered, rather than the sub-
jective intent of its architects. After all, race-conscious line-drawing was per-
missible. See Hellman, supra note 10, at 27. 
 62. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649 (“[W]e conclude that a plaintiff challenging 
a reapportionment statute . . . may state a claim by alleging that the legisla-
tion, though race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as any-
thing other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the ba-
sis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.”); see also 
Hellman, supra note 10, at 40–41; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 10, at 514 (iden-
tifying broad implications of Shaw for standing and expressive theory). See 
generally B. Jessie Hill, Note, Expressive Harms and Standing, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 1313 (1999) (discussing the interaction between expression and standing 
law). 
 63. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701 (2007); see also Carter, supra note 42, at 19 (“Parents Involved, Shaw, 
and Ricci hold that the Equal Protection Clause is presumptively violated 
whenever the government acts in a race-conscious manner, even if there is no 
unequal treatment or tangible injury, because such action allegedly expresses 
a divisive social message or provokes resentment.”); id. (arguing that the 
Court has overturned government classifications that were purely expressive 
only in the affirmative action context, while requiring tangible harm in cases 
challenging discrimination against minorities).  
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Brown itself could be read as involving a limitation on gov-
ernment endorsement, even for classificationists.64 Assume for 
a moment that material conditions in segregated public schools 
were perfectly equivalent. Assume further that any psychologi-
cal consequences of segregation were negligible. Even under 
those (robust) assumptions, people focused on colorblindness 
would doubtless conclude that segregated schooling offended 
equal protection simply because it involved sorting students ac-
cording to a racial criterion.65 In other words, differentiation 
would have been sufficient to justify the result.66 Justice Thom-
as, for instance, has said that “Brown I itself did not need to re-
ly upon any psychological or social-science research in order to 
announce the simple, yet fundamental, truth that the govern-
ment cannot discriminate among its citizens on the basis of 
race.”67 Furthermore, Justice Thomas emphasized that even 
unequal school quality was unnecessary to the decision, which 
rested solely on the classification.68 Brown therefore should 
support the view that expression alone can violate equal protec-
tion, even for anticlassification theorists.69
In sum, anticlassificationists converge with antisubor-
dinationists around the conviction that the Equal Protection 
Clause should and often does restrict the government’s ability 
to telegraph racialized purposes.
  
70
 
 64. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 Perhaps even more surpris-
 65. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 1296 (arguing that the social meaning of 
segregated schools was enough to justify Brown for anticlassificationists); cf. 
Anderson & Pildes, supra note 10, at 1542 (articulating an expressivist read-
ing of Brown, although not from an anticlassificationists perspective); Hell-
man, supra note 10, at 9–10 (same). 
 66. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 483 (highlighting the psychological and 
other intangible consequences of segregated schooling, although those aspects 
of the decision have not been emphasized by anticlassificationists). 
 67. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 68. See id. at 121 (“Regardless of the relative quality of the schools, segre-
gation violated the Constitution because the State classified students based on 
their race.”). 
 69. Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (“In Brown v. Board of Education . . . we held that segre-
gation deprived black children of equal educational opportunities . . . . It was 
not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on 
the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 
1954.” (citations omitted)).  
 70. How would anticlassificationists limit this approach? They could re-
strict their concern to classifications that endorsed racial differences in the 
relevant way (depending on the particular justification for the theory), rather 
than simply recognizing their social currency. That might allow the govern-
ment to continue to ask about race in the census, for instance. But ultimately, 
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ingly, the Free Speech Clause provides an independent ground 
for that conclusion. 
3. Free Speech 
Certain influential conceptions of free speech would also 
oppose such pronouncements. I will simplify here again and de-
scribe two ideal types of free speech theory that I believe cap-
ture the basic features of the debate that matter for my purpos-
es. Libertarian theories emphasize the right of citizens to 
express themselves, free of government control or influence.71 
Several rationales may be given for limiting the power of gov-
ernment in this realm, including the importance of encouraging 
a search for truth and the value of advancing individual auton-
omy and self-actualization. Democratic theories, on the other 
hand, allow greater room for government regulation of speech, 
chiefly when it is necessary to ensure the quality and quantity 
of public deliberation.72 On this second view, democratic self-
determination is hindered when public debate is distorted. 
Government can take action to reduce that distortion, some-
times by restricting certain speech itself.73
Libertarians likely think that the Speech Clause has no 
application to situations where the government is communi-
cating on its own account. Individual speakers are not harmed, 
or are not harmed in their speech, when the government takes 
positions on controversial questions. In a different context, Mi-
chael Dorf has referred to something like this as the “sticks and 
stones” baseline.
 
74
 
whether and how anticlassificationists could work on this problem cannot be 
my concern in this Article.  
 After all, public policy offends people all the 
 71. This category of free speech theory is well established. See David 
Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
1637, 1659–60, 1661 n.119 (2006) (distinguishing between libertarian and sys-
temic theories of free speech); see also OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE 
SPEECH 3 (1996) (juxtaposing libertarian and democratic views). For a fuller 
description of free speech theories, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 3–89 (1982). 
 72. See FISS, supra note 71, at 2–4 (defending a version of democratic free 
speech theory); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 24–25 (1948) (putting forward a classic 
democratic theory of free speech); SCHAUER, supra note 71, at 35–46 (explor-
ing a theory of free speech grounded in democracy).   
 73. See FISS, supra note 71, at 3–4 (“[T]he state may have to act to further 
the robustness of public debate . . . .”). 
 74. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 1277 (“I call this . . . the sticks and stones 
baseline: absent special circumstances, government is entitled to employ la-
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time—government could not function at all if it had to avoid in-
sulting anyone. Dorf gives the example of a campaign against 
smokers, who may find the suggestion that they engage in 
“smoky thinking” to be insulting or stigmatizing.75
 Although racialized messages might be more offensive, 
they too can be answered with words, on this view. Thus, hate 
speech laws not only abridge the speech rights of people with 
racist messages, but they also are unnecessary to protect the 
speech of targeted citizens. While it is possible to imagine liber-
tarians taking greater offense to racialized speech by the gov-
ernment, my sense is that these thinkers are not inclined to si-
lence any such expression. So free speech is not an area where 
theorists of different stripes will converge around a principle of 
government nonendorsement.  
 According to 
libertarian speech theory, the solution to insulting speech is 
simply more speech.  
Democratic theorists, however, would likely find constitu-
tional harm in racialized government speech—and they would 
ground their opposition in the Free Speech Clause itself. Owen 
Fiss, for example, has argued that hate speech laws can be de-
fended insofar as they combat the silencing effect of racialized 
speech on members of the targeted group. Because racial slurs 
“diminish the victims’ sense of worth” and impede their ability 
to participate in public debate, and because such insults deval-
ue any expressive contributions that victims do manage to 
make, state action against hate speech may do more to preserve 
free speech than to hinder it, in the aggregate.76 And if private 
speech can distort democratic deliberation in that way, then 
government pronouncements can too—and doubtless even more 
strongly. So while Fiss himself is concerned with permitting 
state action to protect against racialized speech by private ac-
tors, his analysis sets up an even stronger reason to prohibit 
similar speech by the government itself.77
 
bels that cause incidental economic, psychological, or other harms to per-
sons . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 After all, any distor-
 75. See id. at 1284–86; see also Hellman, supra note 10, at 59–60 (consid-
ering state expression of moral disapproval of smokers). 
 76. FISS, supra note 71, at 16. I bracket here the question of whether the 
government itself can have speech rights. See Fagundes, supra note 71, at 
1637 (questioning whether the government itself can have speech rights). 
Even if it does, those rights may be outweighed by the silencing effect of 
racialized speech, just as the rights of private individuals can be. 
 77. Fiss seems to assume at times that racialized speech by the govern-
ment itself would be unconstitutional. FISS, supra note 71, at 17. Other schol-
ars have made similar points more explicitly. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 42, 
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tion on minority speech will presumably be even greater if the 
disparaging speech comes from an official source rather than 
merely from private individuals without government authority 
or legitimacy. In sum, democratic theorists would say that the 
Speech Clause provides independent justification for limiting 
racialized government speech, even without considering equal 
protection values.  
Democratic free speech theory could be reconstructed as a 
concern for what I am calling full citizenship—for meaningful 
participation in political and social life.78 To my knowledge, this 
citizenship theory of free speech is new to the literature, but it 
offers advantages for understanding why government speech 
can be limited by the Speech Clause itself. Unlike other ver-
sions of democratic speech theory, this focus on citizenship does 
not depend on psychological responses to racialized speech by 
the government, nor does it emphasize silencing, a phenome-
non that is contestable as an empirical matter. Rather than 
worrying that disparaged people will feel devalued and there-
fore be silenced, a free speech theory focusing on full citizen-
ship argues that government disparagement constitutes target-
ed citizens as disregarded or disabled participants in the 
political process. Just as others have argued that government 
expression can violate equal protection by constituting citizens 
as disfavored, independent of their subjective reactions,79
Although the citizenship concept generally is invoked in 
the context of equality concerns, it could be seen to involve lib-
erty as well. To be meaningful, citizenship must not only be 
equal, but also full. Citizens must have the capacity for robust 
exercise of the freedoms that are essential to participation in 
 so I 
contend that racialized expression can constitute speakers as 
disregarded or disabled participants in political life.  
 
at 50 (“Government hate speech can carry a sufficiently strong social meaning 
of official racial hostility that members of certain racial groups are effectively 
excluded from participation in the political process.”).  
 78. See infra Part II.B and Part II.D for other examples of the full citizen-
ship approach to free speech, and Part III.B for a fuller theoretical account of 
that understanding. 
 79. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 10, at 1524–25 (“[J]udgments con-
cerning whether laws create unconstitutional ‘stigma’ are not controlled by the 
experiential response of the alleged targets of those laws . . . .”); id. at 1528 
(pointing out that listeners need not agree with a government message for it to 
have legal impact—they need only understand it); id. at 1544–45 
(“[S]tigmatizing laws can inflict expressive harms apart from the psychological 
trauma or reputational damage they cause . . . .”); Hellman, supra note 10, at 
10 (same). 
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the political community, including the freedom of expression. 
And just as government disfavor can constitute citizens as une-
qual, so too government disrespect can mark speakers as disre-
garded or disabled. Not every government endorsement will 
carry this risk. For example, smokers will not be rendered in-
consequential political actors by government messaging that 
disapproves of their habits, just as they will not be relegated to 
a subordinate status. This is a matter of contingent social 
meanings, as I explained above. But messages that cast racial 
minorities as disabled political participants do run afoul of the 
Speech Clause in this way. And that is one way for official 
communications to violate the principle of government 
nonendorsement. 
Again, not everyone will accept this free speech argument. 
Libertarian theorists in particular are likely to deny that gov-
ernment speech interferes with private expression, or that it 
does so in a way that is constitutionally cognizable. For now, 
however, I only want to argue that one major school of free 
speech theory would challenge the Summum view and embrace 
the principle of government nonendorsement.80
B. ELECTIONEERING 
 Other exam-
ples—particularly the next one, concerning government elec-
tioneering—will invoke freedom of expression in a way that 
does not depend as readily on a particular interpretation of free 
speech. 
It would be unconstitutional for the government to urge its 
citizens to “vote Democrat” or “vote Republican.” Nor could it 
endorse particular candidates.81
 
 80. See generally Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 It is important to identify the 
precise constitutional justification for this conclusion—my con-
tention will be that the best doctrinal hook for this proposition 
is the Free Speech Clause. But regardless of that doctrinal 
 81. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 n.3 
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I suppose it would be uncon-
stitutional for the government to give money to an organization devoted to the 
promotion of candidates nominated by the Republican Party—but it would be 
just as unconstitutional for the government itself to promote candidates nomi-
nated by the Republican Party . . . .”); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 853 
(1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that a legislature 
could not constitutionally “create a fund to be used in helping certain political 
parties or groups favored by it to elect their candidates or promote their con-
troversial causes” (internal quotation marks omitted)). These quotations are 
about funding, but they would apply just as readily to expressive endorse-
ments. 
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point, the fundamental argument of this Section is straightfor-
ward and virtually uncontroverted: the government faces real 
limitations on its own speech when it comes to electioneering. 
Those limits properly reflect concern for maintenance of a free 
society in which citizens enjoy the capacity to participate fully. 
Although courts have regularly policed government elec-
tioneering—usually in the context of issue campaigns82—most 
of the constitutional action regarding electioneering has oc-
curred outside courts. For example, the Hatch Act of 1939, 
along with its progenitors and successors, bars public officials 
from using their offices to political advantage in various ways,83 
and it thereby provides a significant barrier against official 
electioneering. And even though this traditional principle 
against government politicking has largely been extrajudicial, 
it has carried a constitutional valence.84
Why would official involvement in electoral politics be 
problematic? One concern is that the government has such an 
outsized influence over politics, and such a powerful set of plat-
forms for its messages, that its participation could significantly 
skew debate, deliberation, and ultimately decision making at 
the polls. More precisely, the worry is that official electioneer-
ing will both unduly sway individual constituents and unfairly 
 
 
 82. Historically, state courts sometimes invalidated government interven-
tions in issue campaigns, but they usually did so on nonconstitutional grounds 
or without identifying any clear legal authority. See, e.g., Citizens to Protect 
Pub. Funds v. Bd. of Educ., 98 A.2d 673 (N.J. 1953) (striking down a school 
board’s efforts to persuade voters to vote for a bond referendum to finance 
school construction on state law grounds). But see, e.g., City Affairs Comm. v. 
Bd. of Comm’rs, 41 A.2d 798, 800 (N.J. 1945) (upholding municipal advocacy). 
More recently, federal courts have upheld government advocacy on issue cam-
paigns against federal constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Page v. Lexington 
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 275, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that a school 
district’s opposition to a school voucher proposal was government speech not 
amenable to free speech challenge); Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 
626 (6th Cir. 2006) (turning away a constitutional challenge to a city’s advoca-
cy on a ballot initiative).  
 83. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7323 (2012) (prohibiting public employees from 
using their official authority for the purpose of “affecting the result of an elec-
tion”). 
 84. For example, President Thomas Jefferson condemned the involvement 
of federal officers in political activities, and a circular at the time prohibited 
government officials from “attempt[ing] to influence the votes of others [or] 
take any part in the business of electioneering, that being deemed inconsistent 
with the spirit of the Constitution and [their] duties to it.” Scott J. Bloch, The 
Judgment of History: Faction, Political Machines, and the Hatch Act, 7 U. PA. 
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 225, 229 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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disadvantage dissenters.85
Government politicking flouts at least two foundational 
values or commitments. First, it undermines an important 
component of popular sovereignty in a free society, namely that 
the people enjoy significant independence from the government 
that they hold to account. Without that independence, electoral 
politics could collapse into a feedback loop of power reinforce-
ment.
 But the rationale for this concern is 
not completely obvious. If government may endorse policy posi-
tions—as it obviously can, even if it exercises outsized influence 
over debates and even if its preferences overlap substantially 
with those of a particular party or candidate—then why is elec-
tioneering problematic?  
86 Second and related, the principle of collective self-
determination prohibits political agents from deploying their 
office to further their own professional interests, rather than 
those of the people.87 Official action should by public-regarding, 
on this account, even when it takes the form of endorsement ra-
ther than regulation or appropriation.88 Electioneering is par-
ticularly dangerous in this regard because self-regarding 
speech can be used to entrench officials and their allies, block-
ing the pathways of political change that are essential to the 
health of a free society.89
Interestingly, it follows from both of these norms that poli-
ticking should be subject to constitutional limitation even 
where it is desired by a majority of citizens. Restricting collec-
tive self-determination in the short term protects it in the long 
term, because otherwise government electioneering could dis-
courage the development of ideological novelty. Here, limiting 
government speech protects dissenters from denigration by 
those in power out of a recognition that today’s malcontents 
 
 
 85. See Norton, Campaign Speech Law, supra note 10, at 218 (noting the-
se two typical objections). 
 86. See Post, supra note 25, at 153–54 (highlighting the independence of 
citizens from the government). 
 87. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 120 (1980) (“We can-
not trust the ins to decide who stays out . . . .”); id. at 135 (“[T]hose with most 
of the votes are in a position to vote themselves advantages at the expense of 
the others . . . .”). 
 88. Propaganda is an overdetermined term that nevertheless captures 
something of the disjuncture between government speech geared toward re-
taining power and the American form of constitutional democracy. 
Kamenshine, supra note 10, at 1126–27 (discussing the traditional antipathy 
toward propaganda in the United States). 
 89. See SCHAUER, supra note 71, at 43; Greene, supra note 8, at 38. 
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may become the thought leaders of subsequent political mobili-
zations.90
What provision of the Constitution is implicated by gov-
ernment electioneering? Government partisanship undermines 
the basic architecture of the representative democracy, but it is 
not obvious which provision best protects that architecture 
here. One possibility is that government campaigning unfairly 
disadvantages some voters in violation of equal protection.
  
91 
Yet voting law typically concerns actual restrictions on whether 
a citizen casts a ballot, not government actions that warp de-
bate or influence how a citizen will use that ballot. Another 
natural candidate is the Guarantee Clause, but that provision 
has been enfeebled by the Court and other constitutional ac-
tors.92
The strongest remaining contender is free speech, read in 
light of underlying concerns about democratic structure. After 
all, the deepest worry in these situations is that speakers and 
listeners—candidates and citizens—will suffer constitutional 
harm if the government is allowed to endorse particular politi-
cians or parties. That concern goes to a core free speech value, 
namely that democratic discourse should remain sufficiently 
independent of the political agents that it evaluates. To locate 
concern in the Speech Clause is not to say that it focuses solely 
or even principally on an individual right, because the First 
Amendment protects structural values as well as ones ground-
ed in citizen liberties. For reasons like these, most scholars and 
judges have located the prohibition on official electioneering in 
that clause.
 
93
 
 90. Practically, too, it would be difficult to determine in a particular case 
whether public officials’ speech reflected the views of a majority of their con-
stituents. See Fagundes, supra note 
 
71, at 1665. 
 91. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 852 (1961) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (“[A]s to the Fourteenth [Amendment], viewed independently of the 
First, one can surely agree that a State could not create a fund to be used in 
helping certain political parties or groups favored by it to elect their candi-
dates or promote their controversial causes . . . any more than could Congress 
do so . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 92. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should 
Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 849 (1993) (“It is a well-settled princi-
ple that cases brought under [the Guarantee Clause] must be dismissed as 
posing a nonjusticiable political question.”). 
 93. See Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 175 (Or. 1985) (en banc) (rely-
ing on “principles of representative government enshrined in our constitu-
tions” as well as the Speech Clause); LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 90, 101–02 (2005) (accounting for the impulse that 
a government message urging citizens to “vote Republican” would be unconsti-
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Would this sort of electioneering by public authorities be 
impermissible even if it were ineffective? Most people think it 
would be. Perhaps the most powerful way of capturing this in-
tuition is in terms of my theory of full citizenship—the idea be-
ing that government endorsement of a candidate or party itself 
constitutes political outsiders as disregarded or disabled partic-
ipants. Government support of a particular candidate or party, 
on this account, abridges the speech rights of opponents and 
citizens, regardless of any empirical effects on public discourse. 
This account helps to explain the strong, even undisputed, be-
lief that state electioneering betrays constitutional principles 
despite the equally common view that citizens are capable of 
achieving critical distance from government argumentation in a 
wide variety of other situations.94
In the rest of this Section, I will offer clarifications and ca-
veats. First, it is of course perfectly permissible for an elected 
official—say, the president—to endorse particular candidates 
(including himself or herself). A president does this as an indi-
vidual or party leader, not as an official. That distinction holds 
even though the president of course gains credence from his or 
her office, authority that he or she leverages implicitly or ex-
plicitly. And it holds even though public funds may incidentally 
benefit those individual endorsements. I will say more about 
 In sum, a concern for full citi-
zenship explains the otherwise puzzling impermissibility of 
government electioneering that denigrates particular candi-
dates or political groups, even if the electioneering is ineffective 
and even though the state is free to denounce the groups’ ideas 
or policies. 
 
tutional and limiting himself to the Speech Clause); Norton, Campaign Speech 
Law, supra note 10, at 215 (focusing on free speech); id. at 213 (acknowledging 
other possible claims); Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 620 (arguing that free speech, 
and not equal protection, should be the primary source of restrictions on gov-
ernment speech and noting that “a major concern with government speech is 
its impact on the total system of freedom of expression”). But see Nat’l En-
dowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 n.3 (1998) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (noting that although “it would be . . . unconstitu-
tional for the government itself to promote candidates nominated by the 
Republican Party . . . I do not think that unconstitutionality has anything to 
do with the First Amendment”). Justice Scalia’s view here seems to be that 
government funding of speech promotes rather than dampens expression, and 
that it is therefore permissible even if it is viewpoint discriminatory, so long as 
a public forum is not created. See id. at 598–99. 
 94. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 373, 382 (1983) (“Governmental support of particular candidates, for ex-
ample, is not likely to be a great problem if we assume that at least some in-
formation about all of the candidates is available to the electorate.”). 
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the problem of identifying a speaker in Section F. Here, I simp-
ly want to reiterate that my main argument seeks only to es-
tablish that there are in fact constitutional limits on whichever 
utterances are ultimately attributable to the government. 
A second clarification is that a legislature may express 
support for particular policies, perhaps including much of the 
platform of a particular party that constitutes an overwhelming 
majority of the body. So it is a mistake to say that all “partisan” 
speech by the government is prohibited in this broad sense.95 It 
is electioneering or campaigning, not partisanship as such, that 
abridges government nonendorsement.96
Third, some might agree that endorsement of candidates or 
parties is invalid, but object that electioneering is sui generis, 
so that its lessons do not extend beyond this particular area of 
constitutional law. There actually are two versions of this ob-
jection. On the one hand, the concern might be that the free 
speech doctrine governing electioneering is distinct from other 
areas of speech law. This would not defeat my argument. After 
all, one of my aims here is relatively modest—it is just to show 
that there is at least one free speech restriction on government 
expression, in contrast to what the Court has recently said. 
However, I will show further that the ban on government elec-
tioneering manifests a broader principle of government 
nonendorsement which in turn implements concerns for full cit-
izenship and for avoiding the entrenchment of political power 
in a free society. On the other hand, someone might object that 
free speech law is utterly inapplicable. I resist this claim for the 
reasons I have already given, and I reiterate that many courts 
and scholars have already recognized the speech ramifications 
of government electioneering.
  
97
  
 
 
 95. Here I differ from Kamenshine, whose “Political Establishment 
Clause” would prohibit virtually all partisan speech, meaning not only explicit 
endorsement of a party but also adoption of all controversial policy positions. 
Kamenshine, supra note 10, at 1114; see also Greene, supra note 8, at 37–38 
(disallowing all government speech that “favors views supportive of the cur-
rent administration or majority party while disfavoring views of the opposi-
tion”). This would amount to something similar to a strict rule of neutrality for 
government endorsements. See ALEXANDER, supra note 93, at 91 (describing 
Kamenshine’s approach). I address neutrality in Part III.A below. 
 96. That said, partisanship outside elections also may cross constitutional 
lines. For instance, the government could not fund art supporting the admin-
istration while refusing to fund work critical of it. Greene, supra note 8, at 37–
38.  
 97. See supra note 90. 
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Fourth, it is reasonable to wonder whether the more famil-
iar versions of free speech theory would oppose government 
electioneering. Certainly democratic theorists would be most 
sympathetic, because they are most attuned to the functional 
importance of free speech for politics.98 And insofar as my theo-
ry of full citizenship overlaps with theirs, democratic theorists 
would sign on. Libertarians might be less enthused, because 
they might believe that individual voters and candidates are 
perfectly capable of critiquing state endorsement, even in this 
context, and of pointing it out to others.99 Yet even they might 
oppose a pronouncement like “vote Democrat” that constitutes 
Republicans as devalued speakers. Electioneering of that sort 
might well be seen to result in constitutional harm even if the 
relevant conceptual unit is the individual. If that interpretation 
of libertarian speech theory is right, it could also explain why 
Justices who otherwise hew to an absolute view of free speech 
nevertheless seem concerned with at least egregious forms of 
official intervention in electoral debate.100
Finally, special considerations arise with regard to issue 
campaigns, as opposed to candidate campaigns. Courts have 
indicated that it is more acceptable for public authorities to 
persuade voters on the former (including both ballot initiatives 
and legislative proposals).
 Still, the notion that 
libertarian writers would be troubled by government election-
eering will be more controversial than the argument with re-
spect to adherents of democratic speech theory, mostly because 
the former are more likely to think that the solution to worri-
some speech is just more speech, even when it comes to gov-
ernment endorsements of candidates. 
101
 
 98. See SCHAUER, supra note 
 After all, if officials may take posi-
71, at 35 (explaining democratic theorists’ 
opposition). 
 99. Id. (explaining libertarian theorists’ acceptance). 
 100. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 n.3 
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]t would be . . . unconstitu-
tional for the government itself to promote candidates nominated by the Re-
publican Party . . . .”); Int’l Ass’n. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Probably no one would suggest that Congress 
could, without violating [the First] Amendment . . . create a fund to be used in 
helping certain political parties or groups favored by the Government to elect 
their candidates or promote their controversial causes.”). It is probably fair to 
say that Justice Black’s position on free speech aligns most closely with free 
speech libertarianism. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE 23 
(2007) (noting that Black displayed a “robust libertarianism” on speech is-
sues). 
 101. See Norton, Campaign Speech Law, supra note 10, at 216 (taking the 
position that it is acceptable for government to campaign for ballot initiatives, 
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tions on policy questions, perhaps they should be able to en-
courage citizens to enact those positions into law.102 Govern-
ment speech in campaigns like these appears to carry many of 
its traditional benefits—e.g., increased information that can 
enhance political accountability, a counterbalance to powerful 
private advocates, and a valuable policy perspective that can 
enrich public debate.103
Nevertheless, government endorsements regarding issue 
campaigns should be viewed with skepticism. State advocacy in 
situations of direct democracy has the potential to skew or 
dampen democratic deliberation at precisely the place where 
citizens have an opportunity to check their elected representa-
tives through independent evaluation. This is true even when it 
comes to ballot initiatives. Moreover, direct initiatives will of-
ten be closely associated with particular candidates in those 
same elections, so that electioneering on the former can distort 
debate on the latter. Distinguishing permissible from imper-
missible initiatives could (and probably should) involve consid-
eration of whether the campaign concerns an initiative at the 
same level of government,
 It may also entail fewer drawbacks—in 
particular, it may entail a lower risk that self-regarding mo-
tives will predominate over public-regarding ones. 
104 whether a referendum was spon-
sored by a private party or the government itself,105 and wheth-
er local rules subject all policy initiatives to public approval.106
So far in this Part, I have shown government expression 
faces constitutional restrictions not only in the core case of reli-
gious endorsement, but also in situations of racialized expres-
sion and electioneering. From these examples, which are rela-
tively uncontroversial, I have inferred a principle of 
government nonendorsement, which is best understood to im-
plement a cross-cutting concern about all government expres-
sion that infringes on full or equal citizenship in a free society. 
 
This Section’s main contention, however, is simply that the 
Free Speech Clause meaningfully restricts government en-
dorsement in the context of electioneering.  
 
but not for individual candidates).  
 102. See Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 626 (6th Cir. 2006) (ap-
proving a city’s decision to urge voters to support its initiative to establish a 
fire department).  
 103. See Norton, Campaign Speech Law, supra note 10, at 245–55. 
 104. Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 592. 
 105. Ala. Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 820 
(N.D. Ala. 1988). 
 106. Kidwell, 462 F.3d at 626. 
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In the remainder of the Part, I consider situations that are 
more closely contested. I test the principle of government 
nonendorsement against these current examples, working back 
and forth between each situation and the principle that I am 
distilling from the full set. At the end of the discussion, it will 
be possible to see more clearly not only the existence but also 
the contours of this vital constitutional commitment.  
In addition to those general objectives for the overall ar-
gument, the next three Sections have two particular aims. 
First, they show that the examples I have offered concerning 
equal protection and free speech are not anomalous. Section C 
contends that equal protection restricts government teachings 
on same-sex marriage, while Section D on partisan gerryman-
dering augments my argument that government 
nonendorsement sometimes restricts state expression through 
the doctrine of free speech itself. Second, these additional ex-
amples aim to demonstrate that government nonendorsement 
does not operate solely through equal protection and free 
speech, but may involve other constitutional provisions. To that 
end, Section E examines government discouragement of abor-
tion and argues that it suggests a prohibition rooted in due pro-
cess. In these additional examples, just as in the ones above, 
the constitutional requirement of government nonendorsement 
promotes one or more aspects of full and equal citizenship in a 
free society. 
C. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE EXCLUSIONS 
One way of understanding why different-sex requirements 
for access to civil marriage are unconstitutional is that they 
run up against a restriction on government endorsement. This 
expressive dynamic is particularly evident in states where vir-
tually all the material benefits of civil marriage are extended to 
gay and lesbian couples through laws providing for civil unions 
or domestic partnerships. Certainly in those situations, and 
more generally as well, the constitutional harm worked by the 
bans could be seen as expressive, at least in part. That perspec-
tive helps to answer an objection to the equal protection argu-
ment, namely that same-sex couples are not harmed by exclu-
sions from civil marriage in any material way, but “only” 
through speech. Even if same-sex marriage exclusions are pure-
ly expressive, the principle of government nonendorsement lim-
its that communication, just as it limits many others. The con-
cept is that excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage 
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sends an impermissible signal that their unions are not morally 
valued. In this Section, I show how state disparagement of 
same-sex marriage thereby violates equal protection.107
Simply put, the argument is that excluding same-sex cou-
ples from civil marriage carries a social meaning of moral deni-
gration or disfavor that damages their members’ equal citizen-
ship stature.
 
108 That message presumptively violates equal 
protection even when it is unaccompanied by more tangible ef-
fects. Different-sex marriage requirements send such a mes-
sage when they exclude gay and lesbian couples from a valued 
status or role.109
Many people see a message of official denigration in these 
laws. In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court found 
that “[t]he avowed purpose and practical effect of [the Defense 
of Marriage Act] are to impose a disadvantage, a separate sta-
tus, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriag-
es.”
 
110 DOMA’s impact is expressive, for it “instructs all federal 
officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples 
interact, including their own children, that their marriage is 
less worthy than the marriages of others.”111
 
 107. Free speech could be implicated as well, insofar as members of same-
sex couples are prevented from sending the message that they are married in 
the fullest sense or are otherwise silenced, but I leave that possibility to one 
side because it involves mainly private speech. 
 Similarly, the 
Ninth Circuit in Perry v. Brown said that California’s ban 
 108. Of course, saying that such laws denigrate same-sex unions is not ex-
actly the same as saying that they denigrate members of those unions, or gay 
and lesbian people generally. Reasonable people disagree on this question. See 
Dorf, supra note 10, at 1311–15. That disagreement is part of the more general 
contest over the meaning of marriage exclusions that I explore in this Section. 
Consider in this respect the Ninth Circuit’s statement that “It will not do to 
say that Proposition 8 was intended only to disapprove of same-sex marriage, 
rather than to pass judgment on same-sex couples as people. Just as the crim-
inalization of ‘homosexual conduct . . . is an invitation to subject homosexual 
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres,’ Law-
rence, 539 U.S. at 575, so too does the elimination of the right to use the offi-
cial designation of ‘marriage’ for the relationships of committed same-sex cou-
ples send a message that gays and lesbians are of lesser worth as a class—that 
they enjoy a lesser societal status.” Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1093 (9th 
Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded for lack of standing by Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 109. Note that it is the unavailability of civil marriage that matters consti-
tutionally. Different-sex couples who choose not to marry are not disadvan-
taged in the same way as couples who are prevented from making that choice. 
 110. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). The rest of the 
sentence reads “made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States” but 
it is not clear what import this nod to federalism actually has. Id.  
 111. Id. at 2696. 
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“serves no purpose, and has no effect, other than to lessen the 
status and human dignity of gays and lesbians in California, 
and to officially reclassify their relationships and families as 
inferior to those of opposite-sex couples.”112 Likewise, the dis-
trict court in Perry found that civil marriage carries a distinc-
tive “social meaning” in American society not shared by other 
legal unions.113 That court found that the exclusion “does noth-
ing more than enshrine in the California Constitution the no-
tion that opposite-sex couples are superior to same-sex cou-
ples”114 and that it “places the force of law behind stigmas 
against gays and lesbians.”115 State courts have isolated similar 
messages.116 Even some lawmakers that have supported mar-
riage restrictions have appreciated their expressive signifi-
cance.117
 
 112. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1063. 
 
 113. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(“Domestic partnerships lack the social meaning associated with marriage, 
and marriage is widely regarded as the definitive expression of love and com-
mitment in the United States.”); see also id. at 974 (“Proposition 8 reserves the 
most socially valued form of relationship (marriage) for opposite-sex couples.”). 
California’s domestic partnership status extends “almost all of the rights and 
responsibilities associated with marriage.” Id. at 994. Lawyers will argue that 
there is a material difference between the two statuses, but also that the ex-
pressive impact constitutes a constitutionally cognizable harm. 
 114. Id. at 1003; see also id. at 1002 (“Proposition 8 enacts a moral view 
that there is something ‘wrong’ with same-sex couples.” (emphasis added)); id. 
at 1001 (“[M]oral and religious views form the only basis for a belief that 
same-sex couples are different from opposite-sex couples.”); id. at 1002 (“Prop-
osition 8 was premised on the belief that same-sex couples simply are not as 
good as opposite-sex couples.”). 
 115. Id. at 973. 
 116. See, e.g., Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 
(Mass. 2004) (“The dissimilitude between the terms ‘civil marriage’ and ‘civil 
union’ is not innocuous; it is a considered choice of language that reflects a 
demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-
class status.”). 
 117. The House Report recognized that “DOMA expresses ‘both moral dis-
approval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better 
comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’” United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (emphasis added) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12–13 (1996)). Moreover, a member of the U.S. 
House of Representatives said “[u]nless we pass the Defense of Marriage Act, 
we will [be] putting our stamp of approval on gay marriages.” David B. Cruz, 
“Just Don’t Call It Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage as an Ex-
pressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 951 (2001) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. 
H7495 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Lipinski)). Also, Senator 
Gramm argued “[t]o say that we should stay out of this issue is to simply en-
dorse same-sex marriages.” Id. (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S10,106 (daily ed. 
Sept. 10, 1996).  
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Michael Dorf helpfully articulates the expressive argument 
against same-sex marriage bans. He begins by establishing 
that state-imposed expressive harms can sometimes trigger 
constitutional protections, even when they do not carry more 
concrete consequences. So he asks readers to imagine that after 
Loving, states allowed interracial couples to form civil unions 
with all the benefits of marriage, while still excluding them 
from civil marriage.118 Even assuming such laws imposed no 
tangible harm on interracial couples, almost everyone today 
would find them to be unconstitutional. Antisubordinationists 
would predictably oppose them,119 and anticlassificationists 
would recognize that endorsing the overriding importance of 
racial identity can work constitutional harm, as I have noted.120 
Dorf concludes that there is noticeable agreement that state 
expression can work constitutional harm.121
Yet that leads to a further question, namely which social 
meanings are invalid? I fear the consensus might well dissolve 
here. Anticlassificationists believe among other things that the 
Constitution stands against state efforts to delineate people in 
suspect ways rather than treat them as individuals.
  
122 In their 
view, what makes groupings suspect has relatively little to do 
with whether second-class citizenship results. With regard to 
same-sex marriage, they may not worry about unequal citizen-
ship for members of gay and lesbian couples. Even if marriage 
bans are tantamount to classifications on the basis of sexual 
orientation rather than just classifications of unions or ceremo-
nies, people of this view might well conclude that they are per-
missible because sexual orientation is morally relevant. In fact, 
a major thrust of their argument seems to be precisely that 
sexuality is a proper focus for policymaking, according to main-
line American traditions and beliefs.123
 
 118. Dorf, supra note 
 Therefore, my suspicion 
10, at 1271. 
 119. Id. at 1293. See my discussion of antisubordination theory above in 
Part I.A. 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 40–56. 
 121. Dorf, supra note 10, at 1296. 
 122. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 123. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589–90 (2003) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“Countless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have 
relied on the ancient proposition that a governing majority's belief that certain 
sexual behavior is ‘immoral and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for 
regulation.”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution does not forbid the government to enforce 
traditional moral and sexual norms.”). 
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is that this particular instance of government nonendorsement 
will convince only antisubordination theorists. 
Next we might ask, how is social meaning identified? Spe-
cifically, how can we determine whether marriage exclusions 
actually subordinate citizens? After all, the significance of the 
exclusions is disputed. Many people see them as stigmatizing, 
but many others believe that they serve neutral purposes.124 Ul-
timately, there is no methodology for identifying social meaning 
that is not itself controversial.125
Similar problems bedevil mainstream law on 
nonestablishment. There, the Court invalidates government ac-
tions that impermissibly endorse religion, as I have ex-
plained.
 My basic argument is that 
there must be some constitutional limit to government pro-
nouncements regarding gay and lesbian couples. I believe that 
same-sex marriage exclusions cross that line into impermissi-
ble endorsement, but that further contention must remain con-
tested. 
126 Again, the endorsement test asks whether a law or 
policy “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsid-
ers, not full members of the political community,” along with an 
accompanying message of favored status to adherents of the 
advantaged faith.127 Making that determination depends on 
public meanings.128
 
 124. Two justifications have been featured in state court litigation. See 
Nelson Tebbe & Deborah Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1375, 1437–38 (2010). First, defenders argue the laws promote “re-
sponsible procreation” insofar as they minimize harmful consequences when 
different-sex couples have children accidentally. Id. Marriage stabilizes rela-
tionships in a way that is good for couples who bear children without proper 
planning, a category that generally does not include same-sex couples. Id. Se-
cond, states say that different-sex marriage provides the “optimal” setting for 
childrearing, either because there is a parent of each gender in the home, or 
because the biological parents are involved. Id. Regardless of the plausibility 
of these two arguments, the point here is that there is disagreement over the 
purposes—and therefore the social meanings—of restrictive marriage laws. 
 After all, lots of people who feel disparaged 
by government actions will not have a constitutional claim. But 
 125. Dorf tentatively proposes a “reasonable victim” approach, under which 
courts will apply a presumption of unconstitutionality to any government ac-
tion that some identifiable group reasonably regards as a state endorsement of 
second-class citizenship. Dorf, supra note 10, at 1337.  
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 6–7 (discussing Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Cnty. of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (adopting Justice O’Connor’s endorsement 
test)). 
 127. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.  
 128. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 43, at 124–28. 
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religious establishments matter more than other types of com-
mendations because, under prevailing understandings, gov-
ernment endorsements of religion carry special force.129
Likewise, it is certainly possible to conclude that when 
states endorse different-sex marriage alone, the resulting mes-
sage carries special significance. In fact, controversies over 
availability of the word “marriage” have been so intense pre-
cisely because social meanings bestow great importance on civil 
marriage, as well as on sexual identity. A consequence is that 
different-sex marriage requirements affect membership in the 
American political community, at least from the perspective of 
many advocates for LGBT rights.  
 So the 
success of claims will depend on whether government action 
carries a social meaning that endorses religion. 
Of course, whether to credit that understanding of mar-
riage exclusions is the difficulty that nonestablishment law 
shares with my approach here. Both the Court and commenta-
tors look to objective meanings.130 That will resolve most prob-
lems, but it will still leave situations in which multiple perspec-
tives are objectively reasonable. And it is precisely in those 
situations that we need a methodology for fixing social mean-
ings.131
If all this is correct, then government nonendorsement 
prohibits states from limiting civil marriage to different-sex 
couples, because that exclusion communicates disregard for 
members of same-sex couples and for LGBT citizens generally. 
That provides another example of a place where equal protec-
tion restricts government expression. And it reinforces the idea 
that the principle of government nonendorsement works to 
guarantee the equal citizenship component of that commit-
ment. The next example reinforces the other main component, 
full citizenship, and it does so under free speech. 
 Nonendorsement will face this difficulty in its religious 
and secular applications alike. Despite this line-drawing prob-
lem, interpreters should allow for situations where government 
teachings obviously do cross constitutional lines.  
D. POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING 
A disquieting aspect of our political system is the fact that 
electoral districts for politicians are drawn by political bodies 
 
 129. Id. at 126. 
 130. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); 
EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 43, at 127. 
 131. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 1335. 
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themselves.132 That has opened the door to overt political ger-
rymandering. Although the situation raises concerns of self-
dealing, the Court has declined to get involved to any signifi-
cant degree. It has even left undisturbed district designs that 
were explicitly partisan, largely on the ground that the matter 
is a political question not susceptible to judicial resolution.133 
Perhaps as consequence of the Court’s decision to stay its hand, 
self-dealing among party strategists is often perfectly patent 
today, so that district lines are drawn with the explicit purpose 
of protecting incumbents or assuring electoral victory to one 
party or another.134
This sounds bad, and it may well be, but the constitutional 
questions are more complicated than many people realize. At 
root, the difficulty is that it is not clear what drawing bounda-
ries fairly would mean, in a two-party system with single-
member districts.
 
135 Adhering to pure “neutrality” (defined as 
blindness to parties) could actually be undesirable. For in-
stance, it could result in numerous districts that are split even-
ly between the two parties, so that small changes in voter opin-
ion could result in large or even complete changes in legislative 
representation—a result that many people would find unattrac-
tive in the House, even though that dynamic currently operates 
in the Senate.136
 
 132. See generally ROYCE CROCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42831, 
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: AN OVERVIEW (2012); id. at ii (“Most redis-
tricting is currently done by state legislatures.”). 
 On the other hand, allowing the classic form of 
political gerrymandering, where an incumbent party seeks to 
perpetuate its power at the expense of a minority party, could 
have (and may well be having) deleterious effects, including po-
litical polarization in Congress, weakened competitiveness that 
reduces accountability, and the marginalization of centrist vot-
 133. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–81 (2004). For a review of 
the current state of gerrymandering doctrine, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, 
Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1379 
(2012).  
 134. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 417 
(2006) (“The legislature does seem to have decided to redistrict with the sole 
purpose of achieving a Republican congressional majority . . . .”); Richard H. 
Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 266 
(2006) (noting that party insiders are perfectly candid about the partisan pur-
pose of much redistricting). 
 135. See generally Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Hen-
houses: The Case For Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerry-
manders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 650 (2002) (raising similar questions).  
 136. See id. at 668–69. 
  
2013] GOVERNMENT NONENDORSEMENT 683 
 
ers.137
To choose among such values is to favor one substantive vi-
sion of American electoral practices over another.
 Formal neutrality and partisanship both have costs and 
benefits, in other words—and the ultimate values underlying 
districting are contested.  
138 Moreover, 
the answers depend on empirical issues that are themselves 
unresolved, such as whether gerrymandering furthers ideologi-
cal polarization and whether safe districts are less responsive 
to voters.139 Faced with those kinds of contests over both facts 
and values, several Justices have concluded that the matter is 
best left to the political process itself, even though constitu-
tional values may well be implicated.140 And beyond the Court, 
the practice of letting politicians police themselves has been de-
fended.141 Yet the sense has persisted that there is something 
wrong, something of constitutional magnitude, with at least ex-
treme instances of political entrenchment through districting.142
An unexplored way of conceptualizing the constitutional 
difficulty with partisan gerrymandering is to think of it as a 
form of government endorsement. When a state draws a dis-
trict for reasons that are purely or principally partisan, it sends 
a message to political outsiders within the district that they are 
inconsequential. Remember that the whole point of a gerry-
mandered district is to make some voters irrelevant (or dramat-
ically less relevant) to electoral dynamics within its geographic 
area. Partisan purpose can be gleaned in the usual ways, by 
  
 
 137. Pildes argues that competitive elections—in addition to providing 
greater political accountability—encourage strong challenges to incumbents, 
increase voter turnout, encourage political mobilization, strengthen the two-
party system, and maintain the House of Representatives as the body most 
responsive to popular opinion. Pildes, supra note 134, at 260. 
 138. See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 133, at 1390 (arguing that “no 
potential standard for drawing district lines . . . can be evaluated without tak-
ing into account its theoretical underpinnings”). 
 139. See, e.g., John Sides, Gerrymandering Is Not What’s Wrong with Amer-
ican Politics, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Feb. 3, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/03/gerrymandering-is-not 
-whats-wrong-with-american-politics/ (arguing as an empirical matter that 
gerrymandering does not account for partisanship in Congress). 
 140. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–81 (2004). 
 141. Persily, supra note 135, at 679–81 (arguing that redistricting involves 
substantive tradeoffs that are best left to legislatures themselves). 
 142. See, e.g., Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, 
ATLANTIC, Sept. 19, 2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/2012/10/the-leauge-of/309084/; James Polk, Why Your Vote For Con-
gress Might Not Matter, CNN (Nov. 18, 2011, 10:19 AM), http://www.cnn 
.com/2011/11/18/politics/gerrymandering/index.html.  
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considering factors such as explicit statements of the architects, 
the shape of the district, its expected and probable effects, the 
party affiliation of the legislators in charge, and so forth. Dis-
tricts that are evidently rigged express disdain or disregard for 
outsider citizen-voters. This is one more place where govern-
ment expression is constitutionally limited by the principle of 
government nonendorsement. 
One advantage of applying my approach to partisan ger-
rymandering is that it does not depend on districting’s actual 
effects. Again, many of the hottest debates surrounding politi-
cal gerrymandering have concerned factual issues such as 
whether the practice results in legislatures that are polarized 
or immune from disciplining change, whether incumbents real-
ly are protected from challenge in such districts, and, particu-
larly important here, whether political outsiders within a dis-
trict really are rendered ineffective. These issues matter less 
when the focus shifts from redistricting’s consequences to its 
messaging. Then, the concern becomes whether political out-
siders have been constituted as disregarded speakers, not 
whether they are able to participate or whether their exclusion 
generates damaging consequences for the democratic system.  
Another benefit of treating gerrymandering as endorse-
ment is that it avoids deeper questions about the underlying 
values that should drive redistricting. Once a state has cast po-
litical outsiders as inconsequential, it has presumptively vio-
lated the Constitution, whatever its other motivations for dis-
tricting might be. Disparaging voters is problematic whenever 
it happens, in other words, and that is true independent of deep 
questions about the proper purposes of redistricting. Avoiding 
those questions makes at least one piece of the constitutional 
conversation on gerrymandering more manageable (if only as a 
matter of constitutional politics and not for purposes of adjudi-
cation). A corollary is that this claim will rarely be successful. 
Government nonendorsement serves here, as in other exam-
ples, to police only extreme expression. 
What constitutional provision is at issue? Equal protection 
is the traditional answer when it comes to gerrymandering, but 
the fit is notoriously uncomfortable.143
 
 143. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293. 
 Partly that is because 
members of the two major political parties are not customarily 
seen to be susceptible to second-class membership status under 
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contemporary social meanings.144 And partly it is because ger-
rymandered arrangements can exhibit formal equality and 
rough proportionality of outcome, meaning that the share of 
each political party in Congress approximates its share of the 
popular vote.145
Another, more natural claim is that manifesting an intent 
to sideline a group of citizens on the basis of party affiliation 
abridges First Amendment values, including commitments to 
free expression, the ability to assemble into political mobiliza-
tions, the power to petition the government, and more generally 
to unfettered political participation. Lately, there has been 
some interest from Justice Kennedy and others in the possibil-
ity of a challenge to gerrymandering based in the values of the 
First Amendment.
 So equal protection only awkwardly captures 
the constitutional harm when political parties design safe dis-
tricts. 
146 Speech values are implicated not princi-
pally because gerrymandering silences speakers or otherwise 
hinders their participation. That sort of burden has been the 
focus of the few judges and writers who have suggested free 
speech challenges to political gerrymandering.147
 
 144. See id. at 313–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting 
the difficulties in applying equal protection law to political gerrymandering 
cases, which do not involve suspect classifications); Pildes, supra note 
 But such 
134, at 
269 (noting that the constitutional harm is independent of “the right of the po-
litical parties not to be discriminated against in districting” and thus requires 
an approach different from the equal protection framework of cases like Vieth). 
 145. See Pildes, supra note 134, at 255–56 (arguing that the harms of ger-
rymandering—especially the reduction or elimination of political competition 
in congressional elections—is not captured by the equal protection model, be-
cause the resulting districts may be formally equal and because the division of 
districts among parties may be roughly equitable). 
 146. So far, however, this interest has not been accompanied by an under-
standing of the practice itself as expressive. See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The First Amendment may be the 
more relevant constitutional provision in future cases that allege unconstitu-
tional partisan gerrymandering.”); Pildes, supra note 134, at 270–71 (recogniz-
ing the First Amendment implications of partisan districting); Abby Rapoport, 
Does Gerrymandering Violate Free Speech?, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 30, 2012, 
available at http://www.prospect.org/article/does-gerrymandering-violate-free 
-speech. But see Mark D. Rosen, The Structural Constitutional Principle of Re-
publican Legitimacy, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 372, 436–41 (2012) (endorsing a 
structural approach to gerrymandering). 
 147. Without focusing on government expression, free speech challenges to 
gerrymandering have failed on the ground that speech by political minorities 
within these districts is not actually silenced or burdened. See Comm. for a 
Fair & Balanced Map v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 835 F. Supp. 2d 563, 575 
(N.D. Ill. 2011); League of Women Voters v. Quinn, No. 1:11-cv-5569, 2011 WL 
5143044, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2011); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kenne-
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claims depend on empirical propositions that are contestable, 
as I have mentioned. Nor is the concern necessarily that the 
practice damages political competitiveness and accountability—
something that might not be true if primaries are meaningfully 
contested and incumbents feel vulnerable.148 My sense is that 
free speech may be offended instead because evident gerry-
manders themselves devalue certain citizens as voters, framing 
them as disabled speakers and demeaning the exercise of their 
full capacities as citizens.149 Citizens’ participation in electoral 
politics is cast as inconsequential. In fact, that is precisely the 
point of this sort of redistricting. Voters therefore understand 
that they are being deliberately sidelined and deemed irrele-
vant (or much less relevant) to electoral politics in the district. 
Again, I conclude from this example and others that there is a 
free speech analogue to the equal protection theory of equal cit-
izenship, namely that people whose speech is rendered incon-
sequential by a state are made something less than full citi-
zens.150
For example, imagine a state controlled by Democrats that 
redraws its districts using a straightforward partisan gerry-
mander, so that eighty percent of its congressional seats are 
won by the party, even though only fifty-five percent of the 
popular vote went to Democrat candidates.
  
151
 
dy, J., concurring in the judgment) (envisioning a free speech claim, but only 
where a gerrymander had both the purpose and the effect of burdening repre-
sentational rights). 
 Assume that the 
partisan motivation is manifest in the state legislature’s words 
and acts. Republican voters have a claim that they have been 
sidelined by the gerrymander in presumptive violation of the 
Free Speech Clause. Importantly, they would not have the 
same claim if they had suffered exactly the same sort of dispro-
portionate loss because of unintentional or natural districting. 
 148. See Persily, supra note 135, at 661 (arguing that primaries are more 
often contested than recognized by leading critics of gerrymandering).  
 149. Occasionally Pildes gestures toward the expressive aspect of gerry-
mandering. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 134, at 271 (“What matters is that the 
state has treated voters, not as individuals, but as fungible political units 
whose democratic role is not self-governance, but the allocation of political 
spoils.”). 
 150. I introduce this novel free speech theory above in Part II.A.3. and I 
explore it in greater detail below in Part III.B. 
 151. The example would work just as well if the allocation of seats to the 
two parties represented overall opinion in the state as long as safe seats were 
created in various districts, so that minority voters within those districts were 
rendered inconsequential.  
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There is a difference of constitutional significance between 
purposive gerrymandering that manifests disregard for outsid-
ers and incidental disadvantage.152
Of course, the new inquiry will introduce its own questions, 
such as whether a district is actually politically gerryman-
dered. But those are continuous with the sorts of inquiries into 
the role of social meanings in constitutional analysis that are 
common to virtually all the examples I have offered, and they 
are answered by the same sorts of arguments. Moreover, figur-
ing out whether a district has been gerrymandered is some-
thing that courts are accustomed to doing in the context of ra-
cial gerrymandering—albeit only with contested success and 
legitimacy.
 Moreover, their claim would 
work even if competitiveness persisted—that is, even if the 
primaries were so rigorous that incumbent congresspeople felt 
that their seats were not in fact safe and that they needed to 
remain scrupulously responsive to their constituents. And it 
would work if overall representation in Congress remained 
proportionate to political opinion in the state, because Republi-
can voters in now-safe Democratic districts would be purpose-
fully made ineffective. It would even work if the excluded group 
consisted not of Republicans, but of any other identifiable polit-
ical group, such as urban residents or environmentalists, if the 
exclusion was designed to render them politically irrelevant be-
cause of their views. 
153 Factors include not only what district architects 
say, but also considerations like whether the shape of a district 
is bizarre enough to send the message that it was determined 
by improper motives.154
Let me conclude by reiterating that I am not concerned 
here with judicial enforcement, so I am leaving to one side the 
debates over justiciability that have figured so prominently 
among the Justices. Rather, I am crafting an argument that 
would allow other constitutional actors, especially state legisla-
tors and members of Congress, to combat gerrymandering 
without having to resort to familiar arguments that have failed 
to gain traction. They could do that on the floor of the legisla-
ture, in the media, or wherever constitutional battles are 
  
 
 152. Pildes, supra note 134, at 266 (distinguishing between naturally safe 
districts and safe districts that are the product of intentional partisan activi-
ty). 
 153. See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding redistricting 
based on race to a strict scrutiny standard). 
 154. Id. at 647. 
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fought. And of course the main point is to offer another applica-
tion of government nonendorsement that restricts government 
endorsement using freedom of expression itself. 
E. CONDEMNING ABORTION 
So far, I have been addressing ways in which government 
expression can violate equal protection and free speech princi-
ples. But those are not the only provisions that implement gov-
ernment nonendorsement. Here I explore the Due Process 
Clause and specifically the fundamental right to terminate a 
pregnancy. Are there limits on a government’s ability to dis-
suade citizens from exercising this constitutional right?155
There are such limits. Imagine for instance that the gov-
ernment positioned an employee outside the entrance to a local 
abortion clinic, with instructions to shout at every woman en-
tering the clinic, saying that abortion is immoral and that she 
should immediately cancel any plans to end her pregnancy 
through artificial means. Many people will have an intuition 
that an extreme form of such action would offend due process. 
And that would be true even if the government took no tangible 
steps to thwart the women, such as blocking their way or with-
holding funding. 
  
I believe this conclusion would hold under current law, alt-
hough that is uncertain because the doctrine is unfriendly to 
challenges from women. Under existing law, the government 
may not place an undue burden on the ability of women to ter-
minate their pregnancies, meaning that a state cannot take an 
unnecessary action that has the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking to termi-
nate her pregnancy.156
 
 155. See Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and 
the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 360–61 (2008) (“[W]hen 
or to what extent may the state persuade a person not to exercise a constitu-
tional right?”); see also Corey Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What 
Should It Say? The Dilemmas of Freedom of Expression and Democratic Per-
suasion, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 1005, 1005 (2010).  
 “Purpose” incorporates an expressive el-
ement, at least in theory, so that officials are prohibited from 
I put to one side the argument that government messaging on the topic of 
abortion violates the speech rights of either medical providers or patients. 
That contention focuses on government compulsion of speech regardless of its 
content, whereas I consider limitations on ideas that the state may promote. 
 156. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) 
(“Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting 
a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue bur-
den on the right.”). 
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manifesting an intent to thwart women’s reproductive initia-
tives.157 And the “purpose” prong is independent of “effect,” alt-
hough again this may be more theoretical than real—in prac-
tice, the purpose prong has not done much work on its own.158
The government would likely argue that the purpose of the 
shouting program is actually to inform women, not to hinder 
their choice. And persuasion has been held to be permissible, as 
long as it is reasonably related to the state’s interest in poten-
tial life.
  
159
Notably, my hypothetical shouting program is constitu-
tionally problematic even though the government has been al-
lowed to express its distaste for abortion in other settings. For 
example, Congress has successfully defunded many abortions, 
while it has continued to support childbirth.
 Affected women would respond that information and 
persuasion can be communicated in different locations, at bet-
ter times, and in less confrontational ways, and that these par-
ticular messages seem to go beyond persuasion to emotional 
manipulation, revealing a purpose to burden rather than in-
form or persuade. Even more powerfully, challengers would ar-
gue that delivering an aggressive message at a time and place 
of heightened emotion for women has the unmistakable effect 
of deterring at least some of them from going through with the 
procedure. So there is a chance that such a program could be 
struck down even under the undue burden regime. 
160 And specifically 
with regard to government speech, Congress crafted a funding 
program under which doctors could counsel women so long as 
they did not give advice on terminating a pregnancy161—and the 
Court later characterized that program as permissible govern-
ment speech.162 Quite clearly, therefore, federal policy now fa-
vors childbirth over abortion on moral grounds.163
 
 157. See Linda Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 343–46 (2006) 
(discussing recent doctrine concerning the purpose prong of the undue burden 
test). 
 Given those 
 158. The Court seemed to question whether purpose alone could invalidate 
an abortion restriction in Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972–73 (1997) 
(dicta); see also Wharton et al., supra note 157, at 377. 
 159. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
 160. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464 (1977).  
 161. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179 (1991). 
 162. Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001). 
 163. Similarly, Brettschneider has argued that government must protect 
hate speech, but should simultaneously denounce it. See Brettschneider, supra 
note 155, at 1006. Most of the time, those two proposals do not conflict, but it 
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facts, someone might reasonably ask: why is the hypothetical 
shouting program problematic, given the fact that the govern-
ment can send much the same message in other ways, at other 
times, and in other places? The answer concerns social mean-
ings, once again. Abortion is an obvious topic of moral and emo-
tional sensitivity, about which many people have deep and of-
ten conflicting feelings. Plainly, the shouting program is 
specifically designed to exploit a woman’s susceptibility when it 
is at its maximum. That purpose differentiates its message—
meaningfully and clearly, if contingently—from government at-
tempts to encourage women not to end pregnancies from a 
greater distance and at less sensitive times.  
My example is of course artificial, but it isolates considera-
tions that are at play in contemporary disputes. A particularly 
salient example today is the requirement that women seeking 
to end their pregnancies must have an opportunity to view an 
ultrasound image before they can go forward, and that they 
must hear a detailed description of that image from their medi-
cal provider.164 Mandatory ultrasound laws send an unmistaka-
ble message that fetuses are already human, and that aborting 
them is tantamount to killing—they also personalize that mes-
sage by drawing the woman’s attention to the image of her par-
ticular uterus.165 States’ articulated reason for the requirement 
is to ensure that women’s decisions are informed, and there 
does seem to be an informational element present. But it is im-
possible to ignore the fact that the laws are also designed to 
push at least some women to change their minds in the elev-
enth hour, when many of them are most impressionable.166
 
might be possible to imagine situations analogous to the shouting hypothet-
ical, in which they could be at odds with each other.  
 
 164. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2012) (so providing). States have 
passed various versions of ultrasound laws. Right now, twenty-two states reg-
ulate ultrasound provision, seven by requiring abortion providers to perform 
an ultrasound on each woman and offer her an opportunity to view it, nine by 
requiring every woman to have an opportunity to view an ultrasound if the 
provider performs one (as virtually all do), and five by requiring generally that 
a woman be provided an opportunity to view such an image. GUTTMACHER 
INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND, (Oct. 1, 
2013), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf; 
see also Florida and Texas: A Guide to Mandatory Ultrasound Legislation, 
NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. (May 13, 2011), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/ 
media/press-releases/2011/pr05132011_ultrasound .html. 
 165. See Sanger, supra note 155, at 377. I thank Sherry Colb for bringing 
this work to my attention. 
 166. Courts have mostly upheld mandatory ultrasound laws, although 
some have invalidated them. Compare Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abor-
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Carol Sanger has argued that mandatory ultrasounds cast 
pregnant women as mothers or expectant mothers, rather than 
as women deciding whether to end their pregnancies.167 States 
thereby interfere with the women’s decision-making processes, 
although perhaps not with the decisions themselves. Although 
Sanger focuses on visual aspects of the laws, she also depicts 
the harm as expressive: states mean for the ultrasound to be “a 
self-evident statement about the meaning of human life.”168 And 
lawmakers’ motivating belief is that a woman who sees the im-
age on a screen, or even hears it described by a doctor, will be 
less likely to terminate the pregnancy.169 Courts have treated 
the laws as instances of mere speech that do not by themselves 
amount to burdens on the decision.170 That argument is analo-
gous to the sticks and stones defense in speech law.171 One way 
to overcome it is to suggest that in certain extreme situations 
mere speech can indeed burden the decision, and another is to 
argue, as Sanger has, that purposefully interfering with the de-
cision-making process is enough to raise significant concerns, 
even if the ultimate choice is not coerced.172
Interestingly, Sanger herself analogizes specifically to reli-
gion, figuring that constitutional law would not tolerate a re-
quirement that people who decline to swear on the Bible must 
be offered an opportunity to hear the Sermon on the Mount, or 
that nonbelievers must be given notice of nearby church ser-
vices that they could attend in order to make a fully informed 
decision.
  
173
 
tion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding a law that re-
quired physicians to perform and display a sonogram of the fetus, make audi-
ble the heart auscultation of the fetus for the woman to hear, and explain to 
her the results of each procedure), with Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 
432–33 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (declaring a likelihood of success on a free speech 
claim against a North Carolina statute requiring doctors to perform an ultra-
sound, make the image viewable to the patient, and describe the image to the 
patient in specified detail). 
 Her analogy does not work perfectly, because there 
 167. Sanger, supra note 155, at 382–83. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 358 (“The core and motivating belief is that a woman who sees 
her baby’s image on a screen will be less likely to abort.”). 
 170. Sanger herself is not interested in assessing constitutional arguments, 
although they inform her moral analysis. Sanger, supra note 155, at 360.  
 171. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
 172. It sometimes seems to reduce to a claim that mandatory ultrasounds 
are intended to be, and are, coercive. See Sanger, supra note 155, at 352 (“The 
mandatory ultrasound requirement replaces consent with coercion—not about 
the ultimate decision, but about how a woman chooses to get there.”). 
 173. Id. at 387–88. 
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is a freestanding ban on state endorsement of religion that does 
not apply to abortion. Consider that government could never 
discourage belief or nonbelief in the way that it denounces 
abortion in general terms. Nevertheless, Sanger has identified 
a real sense in both areas that officials do not have unlimited 
ability to endorse certain paths and condemn others.174
Stepping back, my ultimate point is that due process may 
provide a concrete limit on at least some government speech 
about reproductive decision making, in at least some (admitted-
ly extreme) situations where strong public condemnation inter-
sects with private sensitivity about a delicate moral and emo-
tional decision. That argument may not be hugely 
consequential as a practical matter, but it does establish yet 
another conceptual limit on government disparagement—and 
one that implicates a different constitutional area, due process. 
Because this example pertains to fundamental rights, it con-
nects up with other examples where government 
nonendorsement contributes to the maintenance of a free socie-
ty. And insofar as limiting official endorsement in this particu-
lar context protects the equal status of women—as several Jus-
tices have suggested
 
175
While it would be possible to go further and describe addi-
tional examples of constitutional limitations on official en-
dorsement, these five suffice to establish the existence and 
scope of a general principle of government nonendorsement. 
They also show how instances of that principle are tied togeth-
er by concerns for full and equal citizenship in a free society. 
—it also furthers the equal citizenship 
value that underlies the principle of government 
nonendorsement. 
 
 174. Government nonendorsement may suggest due process limitations on 
other instances of government speech around abortion as well. For instance, 
the Eighth Circuit found a due process violation in a South Dakota statute 
that required doctors to “describe ‘all known medical risks’ of abortion, includ-
ing ‘[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.’” Planned Parenthood v. 
Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 670 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-
23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2011)). The court found a due process violation, as well as 
compelled speech that violated physicians’ freedom of expression. Id. at 673. 
That ruling was contested, however, and the full court later vacated the deci-
sion. Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 175. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (“[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not 
seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a 
woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citi-
zenship stature.”). 
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F. CROSS-CUTTING CHALLENGES 
In this Section, I anticipate general questions about my ar-
gument so far. The three most interesting ask whether it is 
possible to identify which speech acts are attributable to the 
government, whether government action constitutes expression, 
and how the principle of government nonendorsement is lim-
ited. None of these concerns affects the core argument here, but 
I offer some thoughts on how each of them can be addressed.  
1. Is It the Government Speaking? 
This question follows from the observation that it is some-
times difficult to tell whether the government itself is engaging 
in expression. When the president endorses an idea, for in-
stance, it is not always obvious whether the individual or the 
entity is speaking. A simple response is that resolution of this 
issue does not affect this Article, whose primary ambition is to 
correct the impression that conceded government endorsement 
is constitutionally unlimited outside the Establishment Clause. 
Mapping the line around state speech is not essential.176
While that answer is sufficient, it can be augmented. A 
fuller response begins with the insight that in many situations 
it is meaningless to say that something “is” government speech. 
Rather, lines can be drawn only by looking to the constitutional 
values that are at play in a particular scenario. For many—but 
not all—of the examples above, a key consideration will be 
whether a reasonable listener would attribute an expression to 
the government.
 
177 That is because the harm of unequal or in-
complete citizenship turns on public meaning, which specifies 
not only the content of a message but also its source. So wheth-
er a president’s message should be associated with the execu-
tive branch depends on whether the relevant audience would 
reasonably understand it to be governmental.178
 
 176. A distinction separates government utterances that do things without 
endorsing ideas. I bracket for example a government utterance “in the name of 
the state of X, I pronounce you man and wife,” which itself accomplishes a le-
gal act.  
 That approach 
 177. Again, there may be more than one reasonable interpretation of 
whether a message is attributable to the government. For perceptive treat-
ments of this difficulty, see Carline Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is 
Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008); Dorf, supra 
note 10, at 1332 (tentatively proposing a “reasonable victim” approach to re-
solving such conflicts).  
 178. Note that it does not matter whether the audience agrees with the 
message, but only whether they understand it. 
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would work for antisubordination and anticlassification under-
standings of equal protection, and also for speech concerns with 
government electioneering and political gerrymandering. In all 
those situations, the constitutional principles at play make ob-
jective public understanding a touchstone of whether a state-
ment should count as the government’s.  
Certain concrete characteristics make it easier to attribute 
expression to the government from the perspective of such an 
observer. For example, if the president directs public funds to 
sending a message, then a reasonable member of the political 
community will be more likely to conclude that the message is 
not the individual’s alone. Messages delivered in certain set-
tings—such as the Oval Office or a joint session of Congress—
are also customarily associated with the entity or office rather 
than the person.179
In the religion context as well, constitutional actors must 
distinguish between official and individual endorsements, be-
cause only the former trigger Establishment Clause rules. 
Lower courts have developed a four-part test for identifying 
government endorsements.
  
180 Properly viewed, the test identi-
fies characteristics that a reasonable observer would deem rel-
evant to determining whether the force of government was 
driving an exclusionary message, so that an unequal citizen-
ship status could have been formed. Factors include the central 
purpose of the program, the degree of editorial control exercised 
by public officials, the identity of the literal speaker, and the 
assignment of ultimate responsibility for the utterance.181
2. Is the Government Expressing Anything? 
 It is 
easy to imagine a similar approach in other constitutional con-
texts, with the caveat that such an approach may not capture 
all the relevant characteristics in every conceivable context. 
Others might worry that it is difficult to tell when the state 
is conveying an idea, as opposed to engaging in nonexpressive 
 
 179. Of course “the government” is complex, and the President may be 
speaking only for the executive branch or only for the federal government. 
That matters little to my analysis because actions by any state entity triggers 
constitutional barriers. 
 180. See, e.g., Turner v. Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(citing the leading case, Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 
1141 (10th Cir. 2001)) (determining whether legislative prayer counted as the 
government’s).  
 181. Id. 
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conduct.182 In Palmer, for instance, the city of Jackson closed its 
swimming pools after a court ruled that it could no longer ex-
clude minorities from them.183
My two responses parallel those above. First, the question 
does not fundamentally affect this project, which simply identi-
fies limitations on state signification wherever it concededly oc-
curs. Identifying when government action carries expressive 
force is a secondary matter.
 Was that a meaningless action, 
or did it express racial hostility? People might ask a similar 
question of different-sex marriage requirements.  
184 Second, however, there is more 
that can be said—namely, that differentiating between expres-
sion and conduct may turn on the substantive principle in-
volved. Looking to the social meaning of a government action is 
one way of determining whether it is expressive, and it is a 
method that links up with several of the principles underlying 
the examples I have given. On this view, government actions 
endorse an idea, and thus fall within the scope of my inquiry, if 
they are reasonably taken to do so by the relevant audience. A 
related point is that the relevant distinction for this project is 
not between speech and conduct,185
3. Are there Limits to the Limits? 
 but between expressive and 
nonexpressive government action.  
Finally, someone may wonder whether and how the con-
cept of government nonendorsement can be cabined. How can 
lines be drawn between government endorsements that are 
permissible and impermissible under this approach? Here too, 
the basic objective of the project can be met irrespective of the 
answer to this question. It is enough to establish, for instance, 
that authorities may not engage in certain forms of racialized 
expression. It is critical to remember that because I am not fo-
cused on judicial decision making here, the risk that some dis-
 
 182. Note that this is not the same as the question of whether private ac-
tion is expressive enough to be protected by the Speech Clause. See Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403–05 (1989). 
 183. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971). 
 184. Note also that I am interested in actions or utterances that express 
ideas, and not in government declarations that accomplish tasks in them-
selves. For example, I set aside a speech act that confers citizenship on an 
immigrant in a naturalization ceremony. 
 185. Cf. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (articulating a test for differentiating 
private speech and conduct in the context of flag burning). 
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tinctions will be difficult to draw does not defeat the project out 
of concerns for administrability or predictability.186
Limits can be found, however. Boundaries to the principle 
of government nonendorsement are provided by the concern for 
full and equal citizenship in a free society. Not every official 
endorsement of an idea will trigger even one aspect of this fun-
damental commitment. So to return to Dorf’s example, a cam-
paign to dissuade people from smoking will not run afoul of the 
principle I am defending, even if it gives offense to smokers by 
accusing them of “smoky thinking.”
  
187
In sum, none of these objections threatens the proposal. 
More interesting to me, and more important, is how govern-
ment nonendorsement in its various incarnations transforms 
theoretical debates, including discussions around political theo-
ry, free speech, and religious freedom.  
 Unless the campaign en-
gages in extreme communication tactics that effectively burden 
a fundamental right to smoke under the Due Process Clause, it 
will not threaten the maintenance of a free society. Nor does 
denigrating smokers implicate their equal citizenship stature 
or their significance as full participants in political life. For 
similar reasons, the vast majority of government communica-
tions will not trigger the basic values that shape the principle 
of government nonendorsement. 
III.  THEORY   
If a general principle of government nonendorsement 
properly exists in constitutional law, what are the ramifications 
for legal and political theory? Likely there are several. After all, 
disagreements over government speech appear to implicate 
more abstract debates over the proper role of government in 
modern democracy.188
 
 186. There is a widening gap between constitutionality and court enforce-
ment in the area of government endorsement, given the Court’s increasingly 
strict standing requirements for Establishment Clause claims. See Hein v. 
Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 603–05 (2007). Debates about 
the constitutionality of government endorsements will happen with increasing 
frequency outside the courts. 
 Below, I explore three implications. First, 
I argue that the proposal impacts our understanding of Ameri-
can political morality, resisting two familiar paradigms and 
pointing toward an alternative. Second, I turn to free speech 
 187. Dorf, supra note 10, at 1284–86.  
 188. Smith, supra note 5, at 946 (suggesting that controversies over gov-
ernment speech reflect “the collapse of any working consensus about the prop-
er domain and functions of government”). 
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theory, where I step back and draw out my suggestions above 
that government nonendorsement suggests a concern for full 
citizenship in free speech law that is parallel to the more famil-
iar value of equal citizenship in equal protection.189
A. GOOD GOVERNMENT 
 Finally, in 
Section C, I show how my account impacts the cutting-edge de-
bate among religious freedom scholars over whether religion 
deserves special constitutional solicitude. I conclude that while 
government nonendorsement generally undercuts the special 
constitutional status of religion, it also reveals that some of the 
values driving religious nonendorsement do not have easy secu-
lar analogues and therefore the nonendorsement principle may 
remain somewhat more demanding in the area of religion than 
it is in non-religious contexts. 
What does my analysis, if correct, mean for our under-
standing of American political morality? Possibly, it leaves 
common theories untouched. It is reasonable to think that gov-
ernment nonendorsement merely sets outer constitutional 
boundaries, within which a range of political moralities may 
operate. Another possibility, however, is that government 
nonendorsement points toward a middle path between two par-
adigmatic conceptions of how the republic can and should work.  
One of these paradigms holds that American government 
should remain as neutral as possible with respect to concep-
tions of the good while stoutly defending a framework for sup-
porting those conceptions—a basic system of justice that cen-
ters on popular sovereignty and individual rights.190 Framework 
democracy emphasizes a distinction between the right and the 
good, with government striving for evenhandedness as to the 
latter but not the former, which many think can be defended 
only substantively and on non-neutral grounds.191
 
 189. See supra Part II.A.3, Part II.B, Part II.D.  
 Presumably, 
the requirement of neutrality extends beyond coercive regula-
 190. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191–92 (1985); 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 190–95 (1993).  
 191. See RAWLS, supra note 190 at 190. There is an internecine debate be-
tween liberalisms that believe the framework can be defended procedurally or 
using only very thin substantive commitments, and more robust versions that 
consider fundamental elements to be substantive convictions that nevertheless 
leave room for substantial variation among citizens on questions of the good. 
See Greene, supra note 8, at 18–26. I leave this dispute to one side, and I dis-
claim any implication from the term framework itself that the thin conception 
is more defensible.  
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tions to cover government communications of approval and dis-
approval as well.192 Another important feature of framework 
democracy is that religion is not given special solicitude, but in-
stead represents just one dimension along which people may 
form understandings of what makes up a good life. Other deep 
and broad commitments also must remain free of government 
advantage or disadvantage.193
Framework democracy, it is safe to say, has traditionally 
appealed to liberals more than to political conservatives in 
America, particularly since around the middle of the twentieth 
century.
  
194 Liberals have envisioned a pluralism capable of wel-
coming and protecting racial and religious minorities along 
with other disadvantaged groups, while not sacrificing self-
determination or national unity. However, some figures on the 
left have distanced themselves from that idea out of a mix of 
motives—one of which surely is the hope of deploying moral ar-
guments for progressive causes.195
Government nonendorsement is entirely compatible with 
this conception. Everything that is prohibited by my analysis 
would also appear to be prohibited by this way of thinking 
about the proper role of American government. Certainly, 
racialized speech by government authorities violates the 
framework commitment to equal regard. Similarly, framework 
democracy would not tolerate official electioneering, because 
the independence of citizen deliberation and determination is 
one of its key structural features. Part of the function of free 
speech is to ensure that there is a meaningful distinction be-
tween the popular sovereign and the agents that do its bidding 
in the halls of government. Electioneering by the authorities 
threatens to collapse that distinction.
 And today some political 
conservatives are attracted to a political morality that is more 
formal and less substantive. On the whole and over time, how-
ever, framework democracy has been associated with political 
liberalism. 
196
 
 192. Rawls would limit this restriction on government to fundamental is-
sues of constitutional magnitude, but he presumably would not distinguish 
government conduct and expression. 
  
 193. Note that here framework democracy is distinct from Rawls’s concep-
tion, which focuses on comprehensive conceptions of the good.  
 194. DWORKIN, supra note 190, at 191–92.  
 195. See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS LEFT AND CHURCH-
STATE RELATIONS 97–133 (2009). 
 196. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
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So government nonendorsement might add little to a 
framework understanding of American democracy. Yet im-
portantly it does not cover all of the same territory—that is, it 
does not prohibit everything that framework democracy does. 
There are situations where government speech would offend 
the neutrality rule without amounting to impermissible en-
dorsement. Think for instance of official pronouncements that 
endorse marriage over long-term cohabitation (putting aside 
same-sex couples), on the ground that marriage not only pro-
vides stability that is beneficial for society but also is morally 
preferable. That sort of position-taking could be disallowed by 
framework democracy (where it implicates comprehensive con-
ceptions of the good), and yet it goes untouched by the constitu-
tional theme of government nonendorsement, at least as I have 
been constructing it. Similarly, Congress can denounce abortion 
without crossing a boundary identified in this Article, so long 
as it avoids extreme tactics. In fact, government can take posi-
tions on a wide range of private commitments about which citi-
zens hold passionate views, without implicating any limitations 
defended above.  
Part of the gap might be explained by the difference be-
tween constitutionality, which is the concern of government 
nonendorsement, and political morality. Yet the line between 
constitutional rules and norms of political democracy may not 
be that definite. To the degree that a framework conception of 
political morality guides constitutional interpretation, a conflict 
between the two could develop. Kamenshine, for instance, has 
read something like a neutrality requirement for government 
speech into the First Amendment itself—a principle that is 
much broader than what I argue for in this Article.197
If government nonendorsement were taken to reflect an 
underlying political morality in a similar way, a true conflict 
would be set up between its motivating vision of American gov-
ernment and framework democracy. Translated into political 
morality, government nonendorsement would mean that the 
limits identified in this Article should function as the only re-
  
 
 197. Kamenshine, supra note 10, at 1114. For another position that differs 
from Kamenshine’s, see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Chips 
Off Our Block? A Reply to Berg, Greenawalt, Lupu and Tuttle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1273, 1285 (2007) (“The government, after all, is fully entitled to speak on 
many subjects, including metaphysics and sexual morality, subjects which 
may well express or reflect comprehensive viewpoints and about which the 
government has some obligation to respect the private judgment of individu-
als.”). 
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strictions on government’s power to endorse ideas. Within those 
limits, government should be free to favor or disfavor a wide 
range of views, even if they are comprehensive. That political 
morality would in fact conflict with framework democracy. Alt-
hough this conflict is not required logically by the argument of 
this Article, my conclusion is that there is at least a possibility 
of real tension between the idea of government neutrality as to 
conceptions of the good and a transposition of government 
nonendorsement into the key of political morality. 
The main alternative view of American political arrange-
ments is even more difficult to reconcile with government 
nonendorsement. Engaged democracy holds that the state can, 
does, and should take active positions on questions of profound 
values for many citizens.198
Engaged democracy has been embraced by many American 
conservatives, although to various degrees and not universal-
ly.
 These issues go beyond framework 
questions and include ordinary policymaking matters like the 
importance of physical and spiritual health for society, the ben-
efits of home ownership over renting, what sorts of substances 
people should be taking into their bodies, which family struc-
tures are best, how reproductive choices ought to be limited, 
what children should be taught in school, and so forth. Popular 
expression of convictions is the key mechanism here, supported 
by a conception of government as a central communicator and 
shaper of the values that appropriately characterize and unite 
the political community. So long as people are able to debate 
ideas like these without facing actual regulation or coercion, 
government can play a role in that debate, broadcasting majori-
ty sentiments and otherwise enriching the collective search for 
good policies and right morals. Any commitment to government 
neutrality is rejected as unworkable and undesirable. 
199
 
 198. See Greene, supra note 
 Whatever their other political convictions, thinkers of this 
8, at 68 (“Government both may and should 
promote contested conceptions of the good, through direct speech acts and 
through funding private speech with conditions attached.”); cf. DWORKIN, su-
pra note 190, at 191 (characterizing a political morality that may lead to rec-
ognizably “conservative” political positions); Smith, supra note 5, at 946–47 
(noting the impossibility of government neutrality even on questions of reli-
gion, and certainly on broader moral questions); id. at 952 (describing a “more 
robust, classical liberalism”). 
 199. DWORKIN, supra note 190, at 192; Smith, supra note 5, at 968–69. But 
see Greene, supra note 8, at 25 (defending engaged democracy from a progres-
sive perspective, but noting that “for many left-of-center scholars . . . an over-
riding concern appears to be the use of government speech to advance items on 
the right-wing agenda”). 
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stripe feel that values or morals ought to have a (more) central 
role in democratic governance, and that the state ought to be 
able to (better) reflect and shape the commitments of its citi-
zens. Partly, this attitude concerns religion proper, and is a re-
action to the strict separation of church and state as a constitu-
tional and political tenet. But partly, it goes beyond religion 
and reflects a belief that comprehensive morality is a proper ob-
ject of legislation and policymaking. Some political progressives 
share that view,200
A version of engaged democracy may have been implicit in 
the reasoning of the Summum Court. It gave the impression 
that government can take public positions on a sweeping range 
of public questions, whenever it acts as speaker rather than 
censor or regulator. As I have said, there is a distinction be-
tween constitutional law and political morality that should be 
remembered, but even so the Court does seem to be envisioning 
a strong role for government in political and social discourse. 
Outside of religion, lawmakers can participate fully in the for-
mation and evaluation of ideas and values among American cit-
izens. 
 but it is more commonly associated with 
conservative voices. 
Steven Smith has envisioned something similar to engaged 
democracy in an impressive article on government speech. 
There he offers an alternative to the view that public officials 
ought to be neutral as to fundamental values, inside a frame-
work of rights. Instead, he considers the possibility that the 
commitment to government neutrality ought to be abandoned, 
not just with respect to secular values, but with respect to reli-
gion as well.201 Endorsements would only be prohibited where 
(1) government has been captured or commandeered by a fac-
tion and (2) the faction tries to instill teachings that are not 
closely related to the understood purposes of the government.202
 
 200. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 8, at 68 (embracing a robust role for gov-
ernment position-taking on moral questions); SHIFFRIN, supra note 205, at 
197–233 (envisioning a fuller role for government arguments on moral ques-
tions than that envisioned by framework democracy). 
 
What purposes are “understood” to properly drive the govern-
 201. Smith, supra note 5, at 964–65. Presumably, this license would extend 
to secular matters too. 
 202. See id. at 961–62. Part of the impulse seems to be that a captured in-
stitution would endorse positions opposed by some members. Id. at 959. But of 
course there is no constitutional restriction on government taking positions 
that some citizens oppose—even if they constitute a majority, and even if they 
are taxpayers who object to the way their money is being spent. 
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ment would depend mostly on public opinion and history.203 So 
while the Pledge of Allegiance and the Motto “In God We Trust” 
would be acceptable—according to public sentiment and tradi-
tion—a proclamation favoring the theological doctrine of the 
Trinity would not be.204 In other words, government endorse-
ment has plenty of latitude to operate, with respect to religion 
and nonreligion alike, subject to minimal boundaries. Seeming-
ly, there is no necessary reason a state could not proclaim itself 
“A God-fearing People” or even “A Christian State,” so long as 
that message had widespread support and could be rooted in its 
background.205
Government nonendorsement offers a different view of 
American democracy. Officials do not have latitude to endorse 
any and all values or ideas that many deem worthwhile (short 
of capture). Widespread impulses prohibit such endorsements 
in areas such as racialized speech, official electioneering, and 
messaging around same-sex marriage.
 That is not entirely inconceivable in the United 
States today.  
206
Putting these arguments together, government 
nonendorsement suggests a middle path between two ideal 
types of political morality. With respect to engaged democracy, 
 Commitments to full 
citizenship, equal citizenship, and the maintenance of a free so-
ciety are too basic to American constitutionalism. 
 
 203. Id. at 964–65. While in theory it might be possible for a majority to 
constitute a faction—certainly Madison thought so—that seems not to be like-
ly for Smith, because the very test for whether capture has occurred looks to 
whether it enjoys support that is widespread and longstanding. A consequence 
is that when a government proclamation is not the result of capture, minori-
ties who disagree with it have little reason for complaint, including religious 
minorities. That is why the Pledge is unassailable. Yet government 
nonendorsement points to constitutional values that do protect minority 
groups precisely from majoritarian impulses, even with respect to pure gov-
ernment expression. 
 204. Id.  
 205. Cf. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (“With respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is en-
tirely clear from our Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment 
Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned dei-
ties, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”).  
 206. Cf. Greene, supra note 8, at 37–38 (noting “exception[s]” to his version 
of engaged democracy for “government speech that either (a) favors views sup-
portive of the current administration or majority party while disfavoring views 
of the opposition, or (b) favors views extolling the virtues of a particular race, 
religion, or gender or casting aspersions on a particular race, religion, or gen-
der”). Greene does not dwell on these exceptions, which seem to seriously limit 
his argument that government should have a fairly free hand to endorse secu-
lar commitments. See id.  
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it draws definite—albeit fairly wide—boundaries around the 
sorts of values that public officials may inculcate. With respect 
to framework democracy, government nonendorsement sug-
gests a political morality that eschews neutrality on ordinary 
issues, even though it does not require that view as a matter of 
logic. So the argument of this Article may provide a fresh per-
spective on debates within political theory. 
Fascinating questions remain about exactly how and when 
government may properly instill ideas—particularly questions 
on the ramifications of government disparagement for free 
speech principles. The next Section explores those ramifica-
tions. 
B. FREE SPEECH THEORY 
Government nonendorsement has a contribution to make 
to one important family of free speech thought—democratic 
speech theory. Specifically, it identifies places where collective 
expression should be limited in the name of preserving demo-
cratic deliberation. In this Section, I first explain this claim. 
Then I develop my argument from Part II that a commitment 
to full citizenship might best explain certain limitations on 
government endorsement grounded in the Speech Clause. 
1. Advancing Democratic Speech Theory 
Recognizing the principle of government nonendorsement 
advances democratic speech theory in one important respect. 
The contribution concerns a tension between two constitutional 
values that Robert Post once noticed.207
On the other hand, the political community must be able to 
define, express, and advance its collective values.
 On the one hand, the 
Constitution promotes a social space in which citizens may dis-
cuss and critique the actions of their elected representatives in 
government. We think of citizens as independent of government 
and of one another, and therefore capable of critically evaluat-
ing both. Democracy depends on the exercise of that critical 
evaluation, on the capacity to hold the government accountable, 
and that in turn requires a society that contains the conditions 
for its healthy exercise.  
208
 
 207. Post, supra note 
 American 
citizens treasure their ability not only to critique the govern-
25, at 193. 
 208. Id. For a similar juxtaposition, see SCHAUER, supra note 71, at 40–41. 
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ment, but also their power to direct their official representa-
tives to articulate a conception of good public policy.  
Normally, these two principles—democratic deliberation 
and collective expression—dovetail. Government officials un-
derstand that their prime directive is to implement their con-
stituents’ concerns. When they stray from that ideal, citizens 
hold them accountable through political reprimand or electoral 
defeat. Consequently, the government’s objectives reflect some 
conglomeration of the considered views of those in the relevant 
jurisdiction.209
But occasionally they push against one another. Govern-
ment speech presents one source of possible tension, when it 
works to distort or disable social discourse. That can happen in 
different ways and for different reasons—when officials articu-
late majority biases that stifle minority expression, when elect-
ed representatives seek to perpetuate their offices or prefer-
ences in an election setting, or possibly when public 
disparagement of ostensibly immoral conduct hampers advoca-
cy of disfavored acts. In those situations, government speech 
may so disrupt the democratic processes that constitutional law 
must intervene. To identify those limits is to mediate between 
these two constitutional values. Under what circumstances will 
constitutional law refuse the community’s desire to express its 
values in the name of healthy deliberation itself?
 
210
Government nonendorsement can help answer that ques-
tion. This Article has identified discrete places where constitu-
tional law should interrupt government speech, and it outlines 
considerations that are relevant to identifying those situations 
in concrete scenarios.
  
211
Post himself made only limited attempts to mediate be-
tween the two values he identified. He distinguished between 
conduct rules, which amount to regulations of private speech, 
and decision rules, which merely tell government actors how to 
allocate support or financial subsidies.
  
212
 
 209. Public choice theory complicates this picture, obviously, but not in a 
way that derails the line of argument that I am engaging. 
 Both of these can op-
erate within the social space of public discourse rather than the 
 210. This is a version of the more general paradox for a democratic theory 
of free speech that the provision sometimes limits the ability of a majority to 
effectuate its will. See SCHAUER, supra note 71, at 41. That can happen as 
readily when government regulates or censors minority speakers, id., as when 
it speaks in ways that disrupt democratic deliberation.  
 211. See supra Part II. 
 212. Post, supra note 25, at 178–79. 
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managerial domain of government administration. Where a de-
cision rule is at issue, policymakers have greater latitude to se-
lect the viewpoints that they wish to promote or amplify. My 
concern has been with the limits that need to be observed even 
here—the restrictions on government decision rules that shape 
its contributions to public discourse.213
Post recognized the need to identify a standard for con-
straining decision rules, and he argued that Owen Fiss had 
proposed the most promising standard.
  
214 Fiss had argued that 
government action may be limited whenever it is “impover-
ish[ing] public debate by systematically disfavoring views the 
public needs for self-governance.”215 Both writers acknowledged 
that implementing that standard would be a complex task, in 
which multiple considerations would matter.216 They differed 
insofar as Post believed that it was too complex to be admin-
istrable by courts.217
Government nonendorsement locates discrete places where 
official expression is constitutionally constrained. These limita-
tions are relatively easy to articulate and apply in situations of 
racialized speech, electioneering, different-sex marriage re-
quirements, partisan gerrymandering, and official condemna-
tion of abortion. In fact, courts have found some of the limits I 
defend to be administrable, although I have left judicial imple-
mentation to one side in this Article. Thinking about govern-
ment nonendorsement could inspire scholars and courts to 
identify additional places where government expression works 
significant harm to democratic deliberation—and thus to free-
dom of expression itself.  
  
In sum, my examples of limits on government speech pro-
vide guidance for resolving the tension between the value of de-
liberation and the value of collective self-determination. Gov-
ernment nonendorsement suggests places where the Fiss/Post 
standard should be implemented. This is a contribution in it-
self. Yet it also points to an altogether different way of thinking 
about government speech. 
 
 213. See supra Part II.B; supra note 27. 
 214. See Post, supra note 25, at 190. 
 215. FISS, supra note 71, at 42. 
 216. See id. at 44–45. 
 217. Post, supra note 25, at 190. 
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2. Free Speech and Full Citizenship 
A different free speech rationale for limiting government 
expression is suggested by the arguments of Part II.218
For example, when the government campaigns against a 
political party, or against particular candidates, it thwarts 
their speech, participation, and association—it renders them 
debilitated as citizens. And when politicians gerrymander dis-
tricts in order to sideline particular voters, it marks them as 
politically inconsequential.  
 New to 
the literature, it suggests possibilities that are not available 
under the familiar libertarian or democratic approaches. Its 
core insight is that government presumptively works harm of 
constitutional magnitude when it engages in expression that 
constitutes citizens as disrespected or disparaged participants 
in political life. Just as government disfavor can render people 
unequal in their citizenship stature, so too it can impede liber-
ties that are central to full citizenship. 
Key to this understanding is that it is independent of em-
pirical effects on speech. Even if political outsiders are not in 
fact chilled by hostile messaging that they likely will reject, 
they still have a reason to argue that their citizenship has been 
impeded.219
Also important is that this theory focuses on messages by 
the government. Democratic speech theorists like Fiss address 
laws that seek to regulate, for instance, hate speech by private 
parties or indecent artistic expression.
 So this conception does not depend on social science 
evidence that targeted people are likely to be silenced, or that 
their messages will be discounted by other listeners as a conse-
quence of official disfavor. Rather, it recognizes an independent 
free speech problem with secular endorsements that mark 
them as ineffective. Moreover, sidelining speakers is constitu-
tionally problematic as such, regardless of whether it compro-
mises the independence of democratic deliberation.  
220 But citizens experi-
ence a qualitatively different harm to full citizenship when they 
labeled inconsequential by the state itself. Freedom of expres-
sion is particularly concerned about such action by the state.221
 
 218. See supra Part II.A.3, Part II.B, Part II.D. 
 
 219. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 10, at 1531, 1538, 1542. 
 220. FISS, supra note 71, at 16 (“[T]he fear is that [hate] speech will make 
it impossible for these disadvantaged groups even to participate in the discus-
sion. . . . [It] imped[es] their full participation in many of the activities of civil 
society, including public debate.”). 
 221. This is not to say that a full citizenship theory of free speech neces-
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Typically, proponents of expressive theories of law have 
applied their insights to equal protection and 
nonestablishment. Their main argument is that government 
disparagement of recognizably disadvantaged social groups 
trades on social meanings in a way that renders them subordi-
nate as citizens. That offends equal protection in obvious ways, 
and it violates the nonendorsement value within Establishment 
Clause doctrine.222
My suggestion here is that government expression can also 
run up against a free speech value, namely the concern for full 
citizenship. Government is not now casting members of the 
targeted group in a social relationship, one that can be assessed 
as equal or unequal, but rather it is characterizing them with 
regard to their expressive capacities. It is imposing a legal con-
struction on their political participation that qualifies as a con-
stitutional harm. Partly, the analogy to equal citizenship works 
because freedom of speech has always included an equality 
component, which protects against government discrimina-
tion.
  
223
Another way to put the point is to say that citizenship not 
only has equality aspects, which are already addressed by ex-
pressive theories of equal protection and nonestablishment, but 
also liberty aspects, which are addressed by this new theory of 
disfavored speakers. Just as it is comprised of membership, cit-
izenship is comprised of political freedoms or capacities, among 
which freedom of expression is paradigmatic. Constitutional 
law not only guarantees equal citizenship—it also protects full 
citizenship.
 But more creatively, the full citizenship theory draws on 
the liberty or autonomy aspects of free speech. That is, it rec-
ognizes that liberty can be harmed by government disparage-
ment regardless of any actual interference with expression, just 
as equality values can be offended even if members of targeted 
groups are not harmed in any tangible way or even if social 
prejudices are not actually strengthened. In both cases, gov-
ernment disparagement or denigration is objectionable in itself, 
because it constitutes citizens (as unequal or unfree).  
224
 
sarily would have nothing to say about situations where the government 
stands idly by while private parties disable the political participation of oth-
ers. Yet additional arguments would be needed to show how the theory works 
in such situations.  
  
 222. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring). 
 223. See SCHAUER, supra note 71, at 41. 
 224. Yet another way to understand this theory is that it focuses on indi-
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This full citizenship approach may better account for some 
instances of government nonendorsement that involve the 
Speech Clause. After all, racialized government speech may not 
always silence members of targeted minority groups, as re-
quired by democratic speech theory. And again, libertarian the-
ories kick in only once individuals are thwarted in their speech. 
Yet constitutionality under free speech law need not turn on ac-
tual effectiveness.225 For instance, Republicans may not be muf-
fled every time public officials engage in politicking against 
them or their candidates. Yet casting Republicans as impeded 
participants in public debates ought to be constitutionally prob-
lematic. And that is true even though equal protection does not 
seem to be at issue, for the reasons given above.226
What limits this approach? Like expressive theories in oth-
er contexts, it trades on social meanings. Only certain messages 
will carry the kind of “charge or valence” that triggers constitu-
tional concerns.
 Much the 
same is true of partisan gerrymandering. There, the devalued-
speaker best captures the relevant constitutional harm.  
227
Another limit follows from the fact that the approach is 
much more sensitive to hostility toward people than toward 
ideas. There is a meaningful difference between saying, in a 
 That will depend not only on the social sali-
ence of the denigrated individual or group, and whether disfa-
voring them will be meaningful, but also on the significance of 
the message. So condemning smokers as part of a public health 
campaign will not have the same citizenship impact as sidelin-
ing members of racial groups or political actors. Again, subor-
dination is not the lynchpin here, the way it is in equal protec-
tion contexts. Instead, the concern is with susceptibility to 
official designation as an unworthy speaker. But in both con-
texts objective meanings limit the principle. 
 
vidual dignity in its liberty aspects as well as its equality ones. Government 
must express sufficient respect for choices, including for decisions regarding 
speech or expression.  
 225. More profoundly, democratic theories of free speech struggle to offer a 
reason why exactly a majority ought not to be able to direct its elected repre-
sentatives to utter even racialized messages that silence minorities, whereas a 
theory premised on full citizenship, comprised partly of the right to be regard-
ed as completely capable of political expression, has little trouble explaining 
that imperative. Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 71, at 41 (looking to a principle of 
“equal participation” to supplement democratic theories of free speech, argu-
ing that such a principle “is even more fundamental to the ideal of self-
government than is the idea of majority power”).  
 226. See supra Part II.D. 
 227. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 43, at 126. 
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public school setting, that intelligent design does not count as 
science, despite claims to the contrary by some evangelicals, 
and teaching children that evangelicals themselves are unwor-
thy of respect as contributors to public discourse.228
Obviously, more work is needed in order to fully articulate 
a full citizenship theory of free speech, along with its implica-
tions for government endorsement. For now, I simply point out 
the novel theoretical implications of thinking about free speech 
limitations on government endorsement across a wide range of 
contexts.  
 Similarly, 
public officials can endorse virtually the entire Democrat plat-
form in a particular locality without telling voters to vote Dem-
ocrat or against Republican candidates.  
C. IS RELIGION SPECIAL? 
Government nonendorsement also impacts a prominent is-
sue in religious freedom scholarship, namely whether religious 
commitments deserve special constitutional solicitude, as com-
pared to other deep beliefs. Several influential writers have re-
cently argued that it does not.229 Others have resisted that 
claim, at least in certain contexts and to some degree.230
One of the ways that judges and scholars have long rein-
forced the exceptional constitutional status of religion is by 
pointing out that there is no government nonendorsement rule 
for subjects outside of religion. They assume that while gov-
ernment cannot endorse one religion over another, or religion 
over irreligion, it remains perfectly free to advocate for secular 
policies or philosophies.
  
231
 
 228. Cf. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 120–21 (2012) (dis-
tinguishing between “the respect accorded to a citizen,” which must be main-
tained, and disagreement “concerning his or her social and political convic-
tions,” which should be welcomed even when it amounts to “the sharpest 
attacks”).  
 This habit may have influenced the 
 229. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 43, at 126; BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOL-
ERATE RELIGION? 4 (2013); Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Spe-
cial?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1355 (2012). 
 230. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 
123–24 (2013) (arguing that religion is associated with a distinctive set of sec-
ular goods); Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness, 79 U. CHI. 
L. REV. DIALOGUE 71, 77–78 (2013), available at http://lawreview.uchicago 
.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Koppelman% 
20Online.pdf (arguing that religion is a distinctive proxy for certain goods); 
Tebbe, supra note 18, at 1140–49. 
 231. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
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Summum Court when it named only the Establishment Clause 
as a constitutional limitation on government speech.232
Obviously, my argument here generally reinforces the con-
tention that religion ought to be viewed as less constitutionally 
unique than it typically has been. Government 
nonendorsement imposes constitutional limits on the govern-
ment’s ability to embrace secular ideas that parallels the famil-
iar prohibition on religious endorsement.  
  
Consider here the ramifications of government 
nonendorsement for the influential work of Eisgruber and 
Sager. A central theme of their project is that religion does not 
deserve special constitutional status.233
When it comes to the Establishment Clause, however, the 
question of religion’s specialness largely drops out of their book. 
Eisgruber and Sager adopt something like the endorsement 
test.
 In the free exercise con-
text, that means that religion gets protected from government 
discrimination only because it has drawn public discrimination 
that needs to be combatted. Beyond that protection, however, 
religious observers should not have extraordinary rights—for 
example, they should not be able to claim special exemptions 
from general laws.  
234
Government nonendorsement helps to answer that ques-
tion—in the affirmative. Constitutional law presumptively lim-
its all government speech that deploys social meanings in a 
way that harms full or equal citizenship in a free society.
 However, they do not dwell on the question of whether 
the same sort of prohibition applies to government endorse-
ment of nonreligious ideas. Does their theory require that gov-
ernment speech be inhibited whenever it harms equal citizen-
ship?  
235
 
 232. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009). 
 And 
in subsequent work, Eisgruber and Sager actually do move in 
 233. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 43, at 52 (arguing that apart from a 
concern for antireligious discrimination, there is no reason to give religion 
special constitutional status). 
 234. Id. at 122–23 (“‘The Establishment Clause prohibits government from 
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in 
the political community. . . . Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members 
of the political community.’” (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring))). 
 235. In fact, I would extend that concern beyond equal citizenship to a wid-
er range of constitutional principles, as in the examples I have given in Part 
II. 
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that direction. They say that “[r]ace, sex and sexual orientation 
should all be constitutionally protected against public dispar-
agement.”236
Beyond the basic point that there are some secular ana-
logues to the Establishment Clause, however, matters become 
more complicated. That is because the Establishment Clause 
has been understood to pursue various values in addition to 
equal citizenship. Some of those include: agnosticism as to reli-
gious truth,
 That move makes their critique of religion’s anom-
alous constitutional statue even more powerful. Just as reli-
gious actors are not unusually advantaged on the free exercise, 
so too are they not unusually disadvantaged when it comes to 
nonestablishment. 
237 institutional or jurisdictional separation of 
church organizations and government,238 avoiding divisiveness 
along religious lines,239 and substantive neutrality.240
My own view is that religious freedom law is polyvalent, 
comprised of constellations of values that vary from doctrine to 
doctrine within its broad ambit.
 Whether 
all of these have secular analogues is a complex question.  
241
Consider a situation where the limits on religious en-
dorsement are likely to be stricter than the limits on secular 
endorsement. Since Massachusetts legalized same-sex mar-
riage, some public schools have been teaching students that 
such marriages are worthy of respect, in the sense that they are 
just as worthwhile for gays and lesbians and their families as 
traditional marriage is for heterosexuals.
 Some nonestablishment 
rules have parallels outside the religion context, while others 
do not. If that is correct, then it becomes difficult to generalize 
about whether and how religion is special with regard to gov-
ernment endorsement. Detailed analysis is necessary to discern 
exactly where and how the Constitution draws lines around 
secular government speech, and how those boundaries compare 
to the ones imposed by the rule of religious nonendorsement. 
242
 
 236. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 
 That policy pre-
197, at 1282–83. 
 237. 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXER-
CISE AND FAIRNESS 146–53 (2006). 
 238. 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISH-
MENT AND FAIRNESS 1–15 (2008). 
 239. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). 
 240. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality 
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990). 
 241. Tebbe, supra note 18, at 1127–28. 
 242. Religious parents challenged this practice, unsuccessfully. See Parker 
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sumably does not implicate equal protection for Eisgruber and 
Sager because it does not harm citizenship status. Now imagine 
that the school began teaching that Islam was worthy of re-
spect in a similar way, namely that its teachings were just as 
good for Muslims as Christianity was for Christians or Judaism 
was for Jews. Some Christians and Jews would strongly disa-
gree with that proposition—they would say that Islam is not 
worthwhile, even for Muslims. And such a curriculum would 
contravene the principle that government may not teach one 
version of religious truth or another.243
In sum, the principle of government nonendorsement gen-
erally supports the argument that religion is not special, but it 
does not bolster that view in every particular. 
 It would be unconstitu-
tional for reasons that are independent of equal citizenship—it 
would raise concerns over the theological capacity of govern-
ment actors, as well as worry over entanglement. So this is a 
place where the constitutional standing of religion remains dis-
tinct, even accepting my argument for government 
nonendorsement. 
  CONCLUSION   
The Summum Court was mistaken when it said that gov-
ernment speech is never limited by the Speech Clause, and it 
was wrong to give the impression that the only other constitu-
tional restriction on official endorsement is the Establishment 
Clause. Instead, official speech is limited by a principle of gov-
ernment nonendorsement that cuts across various constitu-
tional provisions and that brings them together to protect full 
and equal citizenship in a free society. Thinking carefully about 
how and why the Constitution constrains such expression also 
generates important insights into the nature of American de-
mocracy, into the operation of free speech protections, and into 
the special place of religion in constitutional law and politics.  
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